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Chapter 3
The Tools of EU Action: To Which
Extent Are EU Institutions Empowered
to Tackle the Obesity Epidemic?
The preceding chapter has demonstrated how the EU1 has become aware of the
urgent need to tackle obesity, and how it has started to develop a strategy to address
the issue. To ensure the effectiveness of this strategy, however, it is necessary to
determine what regulatory tools the EU has at its disposal and how it can best
use them.
The starting point of the discussion must be Article 5(1) TEU which states:
‘the limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral.
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and
1. The readers who may not be familiar with European law should note that the Treaty of Lisbon,
which entered into force on 1 Dec. 2009, has brought about a significant change in the structure of
the EU. The original European Economic Community had been established by the Treaty of
Rome in 1957. It was only in 1992 that the European Union came into being, following the
adoption of the Treaty on the European Union (also referred to as ‘the Maastricht Treaty’).
To explain the pre-Lisbon structure of the EU, the analogy of a Greek temple has often been
used: one common roof (the EU) supported three pillars each representing a different area of EU
activity. The first pillar was the (renamed) European Community. The EC therefore was a
component part of the EU. The other two pillars consisted in the common foreign and security
policy (pillar 2) and in justice and home affairs (pillar 3). The Treaty of Lisbon has put an end to
the pillar structure. In the wake of Lisbon, the European Union (EU) has succeeded to and
replaced the European Community. The pillars have been merged into the Treaties, that is,
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). This book relies on the new numbering of Treaty articles introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty. On the structure of the EU, see in particular J.-P. Jacque´, ‘La Complexite´
d’un Traite´ Simplifie´: Le Traite´ de Lisbonne et la Coexistence des Trois Traite´s’, Revue des
Affaires Europe´ennes (2007–2008): 177. For general references on EU law, see the selected
bibliography at the end of this chapter.
proportionality’. The importance of this article cannot be overstated, as it sets out a
two-step test to determine whether the EU is entitled to take a given course of
action: it must first be ascertained that the EU has the powers to act (principle of
conferral); if so, the EU must ensure that it exercises its powers in conformity with
the twin principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The EU may only act if a
measure passes both tests.
The principle of conferral reflects the seminal judgment of the Van Gend en
Loos case, where the Court of Justice stated that ‘the [EU] constitutes a new legal
order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise
not only Member States but also their nationals’.2 In other words, if the TEU and
TFEU (hereafter ‘the Treaties’)3 do not provide a legal basis for an EU interven-
tion, action can only be taken by Member States. The EU legal order is a system of
multi-level governance and the EU is constitutionally bound to respect the allo-
cation of competence established in the Treaties between itself and its Member
States. The principle of conferral has proven extremely difficult to apply in
practice, as the discussion of the case law of the Court of Justice will illustrate.
As far as obesity more specifically is concerned, this principle means that the EU
cannot adopt all the measures which are necessary to prevent this multi-factorial
condition: some measures will originate from the EU, whereas some others will
have to be adopted by the Member States, at national or at local level, due to a lack
of EU competence.
The difficulties do not stop at this first stage. Once it has been established that
the EU has the competence to act, the second step consists in determining whether,
and if so how, it should exercise its powers. The principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality constrain EU action, by requiring, first, that the EU should act only
when the objectives of a proposed action can be better achieved by the EU than by
Member States and, secondly, that EU action should not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve the objectives pursued.
The aim of this chapter is, first, to introduce the principles underlying EU
action and, secondly, to determine how they come into play in matters of obesity
prevention. Public health advocacy and lobbying strategies may only be effective if
they rely on a thorough understanding of these issues. This chapter defines the
meaning and scope of the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality.
It concludes with a case study illustrating how difficult it may be to draw bound-
aries between legitimate and illegitimate EU action: schools as a priority setting.
2. Emphasis added. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3. Art. 1(1) TEU reiterates and
emphasizes this principle: ‘By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among them-
selves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘‘the Union’’ on which the Member States confer
competences to attain objectives they have in common.’ (Emphasis added)
3. There have been five main Treaty reforms to date: the Single European Act 1986; the Treaty on
the European Union 1992 (also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty); the Treaty of Amsterdam
1997; the Treaty of Nice 2001; and the Treaty of Lisbon 2007 which entered into force on 1 Dec.
2009.
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I. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFERRAL
TO THE EU’S OBESITY PREVENTION STRATEGY
The question of EU competence is fundamental. It circumscribes EU intervention
and thus determines its legality in all areas of policy making. It is all the more
relevant when dealing with issues such as obesity prevention which require a
coordinated action in a wide range of policy areas to be dealt with effectively.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFERRAL AND THE EU LEGAL ORDER
As stated above, the EU rests on the principle of conferral. If it is given the
necessary powers to regulate certain fields of activity, these powers are circum-
scribed by the provisions of the Treaties. The general power to act rests with
Member States, subject to the transfer of their sovereign rights, which they have
operated to the benefit of the EU in defined areas only.4 Article 5 therefore pro-
vides that EU intervention is limited and specific.
The Treaties constrain EU action both from a substantive and from a formal
point of view. The substance is governed by Articles 2 and 3 TEU and by Articles 2
to 6 TFEU. Article 2 TEU sets out the EU’s ‘basic values and objectives’,5 whereas
Article 3 TEU lists the tasks assigned to the EU. These provisions provide a basis
to interpret the scope of the specific legal bases which are found later on in the
Treaties.
The Treaty of Lisbon expressly classifies EU competences, thus limiting the
risk for certain controversies between the Member States and the EU.6 Articles 2,
3, 4 and 6 TFEU expressly distinguish between exclusive, shared and supporting
EU competences and give an indicative list of subjects falling within each com-
petence heading. The exact scope of the competences is to be found in the third part
of the TFEU.7 The difficulties therefore reside in the need to draw the boundaries
separating what is permissible from what is not. The EU policies which are likely to
be most relevant to obesity prevention include, as already mentioned in Chapter 2,
the internal market, consumer protection, public health, the common agricultural
policy, taxation, education, sport and transport.8
Apart from the substantive areas of EU action, the Treaties also define which
instruments and procedures should be used for each of them. From a formal point
of view, it empowers EU institutions to adopt measures which must comply with
4. Article 1(1) TEU reiterates this principle: ‘By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish
among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘‘the Union’’ on which the Member
States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.’ (Emphasis added).
5. M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, Common Market Law
Review 45 (2008): 617, at 653.
6. See in particular R. Schu¨tze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of
European Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 130.
7. Article 2(6) read together with Arts 26–212 TFEU.
8. The relevance of these areas to obesity prevention is assessed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
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its provisions.9 Furthermore, Article 288 TFEU lists the different categories of
Union acts. It provides that ‘to exercise the Union’s competences, the institutions
shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions’. It
then goes on to define each of these acts:
– Article 288(2): ‘a regulation shall have general application. It shall be
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States’. Reg-
ulations become part of the law of the Member States without being imple-
mented at national level.
– Article 288(3) EC: ‘a directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’. Directives
must therefore be distinguished from regulations to the extent that they are
not directly applicable and that they shall be implemented before the expiry
of a specific deadline to become an integral part of the laws of each of
the Member States.10 Member States are bound to implement directives
within the specified time limit and failure to do so adequately may have
consequences.11
– Article 288(4) EC: ‘a decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision
which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on
them’. This means that a decision does not have general application and
should be distinguished on this point from both regulations and directives.
It is however comparable to a regulation in that it is directly applicable.
– Article 288(5): ‘recommendations and opinions shall have no binding
force’. Recommendations and opinions are two forms of non-binding mea-
sures which EU institutions may adopt; they only have persuasive value. EU
institutions also rely on other non-binding measures than recommendations
and opinions, even though they are not listed in the Treaties. They include
communications, green papers, white papers, guidelines, etc.
The main distinction which Article 288 establishes is between binding and
non-binding acts: regulations, directives and decisions are binding legislative
9. In other words, primary legislation (provisions of the TEU and the TFEU) takes precedence over
secondary legislation (measures adopted on the basis of the Treaties), which means, for
example, that a directive (secondary legislation) must not contravene any Treaty provision
(primary legislation). On EU legislation, see A. Tu¨rk, The Concept of Legislation in European
Community Law: A Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006).
10. On the distinction between regulations and directives, see Ch. 4 below.
11. The obligation to implement directives is a specific application of Art. 4(3) TEU (ex-Art. 10 EC)
which requires that Member States cooperate with EU institutions to ensure that the obligations
arising out of the Treaties are fulfilled: ‘pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the
Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks
which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the
acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of
the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the
Union’s objectives.’
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instruments (‘hard law’),12 whereas recommendations and opinions are not (‘soft
law’).13 This distinction is particularly important where the powers of the Union
may be more or less extensive and their intensity may vary depending on each
policy area. In areas of supportive competence, the EU may only adopt soft-law
measures, whereas in areas of exclusive or shared competences, it may adopt a mix
of both legislative and soft-law measures.14 It is therefore necessary to determine
the nature of the powers which the Treaties have granted the EU in each of its fields
of competence.
One of the corollaries of the principle of conferral is that binding acts adopted
by EU institutions must state the reasons on which they are based.15 All regula-
tions, directives and decisions must therefore have a legal basis which identifies
the Treaty article(s) permitting that such action be taken. This requirement is
intended to make EU institutions more accountable and the legislative process
more transparent.16
If the EU is granted the necessary powers to adopt binding legislation in a
given policy area, the legal basis relied upon will also determine the legislative
procedure applies and must be followed. The TFEU distinguishes different
legislative procedures, which give different powers to different institutions.
In particular, the procedures vary depending on the role assigned to the European
Parliament and the voting mechanisms applicable in the Council. This book is not
the place to discuss at length the different procedures in existence. A few
characteristic features of the EU legislative process are nonetheless underlined
here for the readers who are not familiar with EU law.
Article 13(1) TEU refers to seven main EU institutions: the European Parlia-
ment, the European Council, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of
Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the Court of
Auditors.17 All seven of them must act within the limits of their powers. The
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an
Economic and Social Committee and a Committee of the Regions acting in an
advisory capacity.18
12. Article 288 TFEU does not establish any hierarchy between various acts. They must nonetheless
be distinguished, as they are of a different nature and their legal effects may differ.
13. All EU acts must be published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ).
14. As discussed in more detail below, it is not because they lack formal legal force that soft law
instruments may not have significant effects in practice. See F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of
European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, Modern Law
Review 56 (1993): 19, at 32.
15. Article 296 TFEU.
16. The legislative process can be traced back at <ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL¼en>.
17. The latter two, whose role is unlikely to be significant in relation to the development of the EU’s
obesity prevention strategy, are not considered any further in this book.
18. Article 13(4) TEU.
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The European Commission is entrusted with the development of EU policies.
Its members must be independent from the Member States and must act in the
interest of the EU.19 The Commission has a broad range of powers. First of all, it
has the almost exclusive20 right to make legislative proposals.21 It also has signif-
icant administrative powers, whereby it monitors the implementation and the out-
come of its policies. Furthermore, it possesses executive powers, which enable the
Commission to represent the EU in international negotiations and to play an
important role in setting the EU budget. It also has powers to adopt delegated and
implementing acts.22 These powers are intended to allow the EU to react quickly
and flexibly to tackle changes, for example in market behaviour, and they are
supposed to create incentives for the EU legislature to set broad targets only and
to leave the details to the Commission. The Commission’s delegated powers are
however subject to scrutiny by the European Parliament and the Council or by the
comitology procedure.23
The Commission currently consists of twenty-seven Commissioners, one for
each Member State.24 As from 1 November 2014, the number of Commissioners
will be reduced to two-thirds of the number of EU Member States with a view to
facilitating decision making.25 The Commission is subdivided into departments,
so-called Directorates-General (DG), each of which deals with a specific policy
field and is headed by one Commissioner.26 The DG in charge of coordinating the
Union’s obesity prevention strategy is DG for Health and Consumer Protection
(generally referred to as DG SANCO, for ‘DG Sante´ et Consommateurs’).
19. Article 17(3) TEU and Art. 245 TFEU.
20. It is worth noting, however, that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced the ‘citizen’s initiative’:
Art. 11(4) TEU empowers a group of ‘not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a
significant number of Member States’ to invite the European Commission ‘to submit any
appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required’.
Detailed provisions for this citizen’s initiative will have to be elaborated by the European
Parliament and the Council through Regulations (see Art. 11(4) TEU read in conjunction
with Art. 24(1) TFEU).
21. Article 17(2) TEU. Arts 223, 256 and 281 TFEU provide exceptions to this rule. On the role
of the European Commission in the EU law-making process, see A. Tu¨rk, The Concept of
Legislation in European Community Law: A Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2006), at 197.
22. Articles 290 and 291 TFEU. These articles distinguish delegated acts (which enable the
Commission to ‘supplement or amend certain non-essential elements’ of legislative acts) and
implementing acts (which facilitate the uniform implementation of EU acts); it is, however,
difficult to draw a clear line between them. M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning
Minds, Not Hearts’, Common Market Law Review 45 (2008): 617, at 649.
23. The comitology procedure is a tool which is intended to ensure that the Commission respects the
interests of the Member States whilst legislating.
24. Article 17(4) TEU.
25. Article 17(5) TEU.
26. The Lisbon Treaty created the new post of ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy’ whose incumbent is also a Vice-President to the Commission.
As this post has no major significance for the purposes of this book, the implications of this
double-seated Commissioner are not discussed here.
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The Council, which is composed of representatives of the Member States,27
has most importantly been entrusted with the adoption of EU legislation. However,
even though the Council is the EU’s main law-making body, it does not have the
powers to initiate legislation; it may however request that a legislative proposal be
put forward on a specific issue.28 As discussed in Chapter 2 above, the Council has
called on the Commission to develop proposals to combat overweight and obesity
on several occasions, which has led the Commission to initiate a broad consulta-
tion of stakeholders and ultimately adopt the Obesity Prevention White Paper in
May 2007.29
With regard to voting procedures in the Council, these vary depending on the
legal basis relied upon. In the first thirty years of the European Community, the rule
was that without unanimous agreement in the Council, the legislative instrument
proposed by the Commission would not be adopted, notwithstanding the policy
area at stake.30 In other words, each Member State had a veto over any legislative
proposal it did not agree with. With the enlargement of the European Community
to new Member States, the unanimity requirement soon turned out to be extremely
cumbersome in practice and all meaningful legislative initiative blocked. The
TEC was therefore revised in 1986 by the Single European Act and qualified
majority voting (QMV) in Council was introduced. Following subsequent Treaty
amendments, QMV has been extended to a range of policies and has now become
the norm rather than the exception.31 Unanimity voting nonetheless remains in
place for certain areas of EU competence.32 The procedure of QMV allows for the
adoption of a legislative proposal if a certain majority of votes is cast in favour of
the proposal in question.
Until 31 October 2014, a qualified majority is achieved if: (1) a simple major-
ity of Member States casts; (2) at least 255 votes33 in favour of the measure; and
(3) if these Member States represent at least 62% of the population of the Union.
These three requirements, which have to be fulfilled cumulatively, constitute the
27. Article 16(2) TEU.
28. Article 241 TFEU. Writing in 1999, Westlake evaluated that 13% of Commission proposals
originated from Member States’ requests, 12% from programmes agreed with Council and 8%
from Council’s request. Cited in A. Tu¨rk, The Concept of Legislation in European Community
Law: A Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006), at 201.
29. See Ch. 2 above.
30. An early exception to the unanimity rule could be found in the EEC Treaty: In 1966, majority
voting was to be introduced for issues relating to the Common Agricultural Policy. This trig-
gered a conflict with France which culminated in the so-called ‘empty-chair policy’ of President
De Gaulle and which ended with the Luxembourg Accord. For further information, see
P. Craig & G. De Bu´rca, EU Law, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 8.
31. Article 238 TFEU provides that QMV is the rule, except when otherwise provided.
32. This is notably the case for taxation policy. The rather limited powers of the Union in this field
are discussed in Ch. 7 below.
33. Each Member State has between four and twenty-nine votes, depending in part on the size of
their population: see Art. 3(3) of the Protocol (N 36) on Transitional Provisions, OJ 2008
C115/201.
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so-called triple threshold required for a measure to be adopted.34 From 1 November
2014 on, ‘a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of
the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States
comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union. A blocking minority
must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority
shall be deemed attained’.35 However, until 31 March 2017, each Member State
can still request that measures be based upon the old QMV rules.36 If, from that
time on, the majority is relatively slim, dissenting countries can indicate their
opposition to the act which is to be adopted. The Council then has to discuss the
issue and do ‘all in its power to reach . . . a satisfactory solution to address concerns
raised’ by the dissenting countries which includes the endeavour to create a broader
majority in the Council.37 This tool cannot hinder measures if the qualified major-
ity as defined above has been achieved. However, it can delay the adoption of
those measures, and the need to find a broader consensus might lead to amend-
ments of the original act. Although Poland lobbied extensively for the inclusion of
this mechanism, it yet needs to be established how powerful it will become in
practice.38
The advent of QMV reinforces the supranational nature of the Union’s legal
order, insofar as Member States may end up being bound by an EU measure which
they do not approve of and which they have voted against in Council.
The European Parliament, which is directly elected by European citizens to
represent them, has seen its legislative role grow over time. Originally, the
European Parliament was not intended to be a law-making body. Its role in the
legislative process was merely consultative. The Council was under a duty to ask
for its opinion, but this opinion had no binding force. In the wake of the five Treaty
amendments which have taken place since 1986, the role of the European Parlia-
ment has become increasingly important and it has now become the Council’s
co-legislator in a broad range of policy areas, including the core area of internal
market law. When the TEU was first adopted in 1992, the co-decision procedure
was introduced; it has then been gradually extended by subsequent Treaty amend-
ments to become the norm. The Lisbon Treaty refers to this procedure as ‘the
34. Article 16(5) TEU read together with Art. 3(3) of the Protocol (N 36) on Transitional Provi-
sions, OJ 2008 C115/201.
35. Article 16(4) TEU. If the Council does not act on a proposal from the Commission or from the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, there are higher
thresholds to be attained (Art. 238(2) TFEU).
36. Article 3(2) of the Protocol (N 36) on Transitional Provisions, OJ 2008 C115/201.
37. Articles 1–3 of the Declaration (N 7). As of 1 Apr. 2007, Arts 4–6 of the same declaration
apply, setting out other thresholds.
38. The similar Ioannina compromise has hitherto rarely if ever been used. Declaration N 7 adapts
to the EU 27 the Ioannina Compromise of 1994, which had originally been adopted to cope with
new majorities in the Council when Finland, Austria, Sweden and Norway were to join the EU.
As Norway did not join the EU, this compromise has remained little more than a gentlemen’s
agreement.
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ordinary legislative procedure’.39 Hence, the European Parliament now effectively
enjoys a right of veto in several important areas when it is not able to find a
common position with the Council.40 This system reflects the idea that the citizens
and the Member States are the ‘Union’s dual democratic basis of democratic
legitimacy’ and that both of them should be represented at EU level through the
European Parliament and the Council, respectively.41 Nevertheless, there are still
certain policy areas, in which the European Parliament is granted less power.
Under so-called special legislative procedures, it may only need to be consulted,42
or give its consent to an act.43 The European Parliament can request the
Commission to make a legislative proposal.44
The European Council, which is a different institution from the Council,
consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States as well as
its president and the president of the Commission.45 Its role is to ‘provide the Union
with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to ‘define the general political
directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions’.46
In other words, the European Council is responsible for developing the vision
of the EU, not for its day-to-day business. Its powers are important, as they com-
prise issues such as the allocation of its members between Member States, propos-
ing the Commission President and appointing the Commission after it has been
approved by the European Parliament.47 The European Council is headed by a
Council President, a novelty introduced by the Lisbon Treaty which put an end to
the rotating presidency. The term of office of the Council President is two years and
a half, renewable once.48
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has a duty to ‘ensure that
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’.49 It
comprises three distinct courts: The Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance
39. Already after the amendments introduced at Amsterdam and Nice, the ordinary legislative
procedure covered more than half of the Union’s legislation. See A. Tu¨rk, The Concept of
Legislation in European Community Law: A Comparative Perspective (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2006), at 219, citing R. Corbett, F. Jacobs & M. Shackleton, The European
Parliament, 6th edn. (John Harper Publishing, 2005), at 210. The functioning of this procedure
is described in detail in Art. 294 TFEU.
40. Article 294(12) TFEU.
41. Article 10 TEU.
42. This is the case for harmonizing measures in the field of indirect taxation adopted on the basis of
Article 113 TFEU. For more information on the taxation policy of the EU and its impact on
obesity prevention strategies developed at EU and national levels, see Ch. 7 below.
43. This is the case for the flexibility clause contained in Art. 352 TFEU.
44. Article 225 TFEU.
45. Article 15(2) TEU.
46. Article 15(1) TEU.
47. Articles 14(2) and 17(7) TEU respectively. The Lisbon Treaty added another new competence
which might become important for obesity prevention with regard to indirect taxation: accord-
ing to Art. 48(7) TEU, the European Council is granted the power to authorize the Council to act
on QMV instead of unanimity in this area. However, national parliaments can veto this decision.
48. Article 15 TEU. Its first incumbent is the former Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy.
49. Article 19(1) TEU.
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(renamed the General Court following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty)
and the Court for the EU’s Public Service. The Court of Justice and the General
Court are each composed of one judge per Member State. The Court of Justice is
assisted by eight Advocates-General (AG).50
The powers of the Court of Justice are varied. In particular, it can adjudicate
where national judicial authorities have referred questions of EU law on which they
need guidance to resolve a dispute.51 The Court of Justice can also hear direct
actions brought by Member States or EU institutions: if the EU legislature adopts
binding acts which fall outside the areas of EU competence or if it has done so
without following the proper procedure, a Member State could lodge a judicial
review action before the Court which is empowered to annul measures adopted in
breach of Treaty provisions.52 The wide powers of the CJEU in relation to the
annulment of EU measures make it the constitutional court of the EU acting as the
guardian of the Treaties.53
It is arguable that the introduction of QMV in Council, following the entry
into force of the Single European Act, has reinforced the role of the CJEU in
arbitrating disputes relating to the extent of EU competence. This is all the
more so as subsequent Treaty amendments at Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and
Lisbon have extended QMV to a broad range of EU policies. This is logical: before
QMV was introduced, Member States could avoid to be bound by a given legis-
lative act by simply vetoing its adoption, which is no longer possible now that
QMV has become the rule for a growing range of acts. Hence, the only alternative
left to this Member State is to challenge the validity of the unwanted act before
the Court of Justice on one of the grounds listed in the Treaties and which include
lack of competence, fundamental procedural shortcomings (adoption of the wrong
legislative procedure, failure to state reasons, etc.) and breach of the general prin-
ciples of EU law (including fundamental rights, as well as the subsidiarity and the
proportionality principles, both discussed below).54
The outer limits of EU competence have given rise to vivid controversies in
practice. This is not surprising to the extent that the principle of conferral allows for
the arbitration of the sharing of powers between Member States and the EU, and the
extent to which the intervention of the latter has curtailed the sovereignty of the
50. However, the number of the Advocates General will be increased by three, if the CJEU so
requests: see Declaration N 38, OJ 2008 C115/335, at 350.
51. This procedure is referred to as the preliminary ruling procedure and is described in Art. 267
TFEU (ex-Art. 234 EC). For an example of preliminary ruling, see the De Agostini judgment
discussed in Ch. 5 below.
52. Article 263 TFEU (ex-Art. 230 EC). This reflects the fact that the Union is based on the rule of
law, as expressly stated in Art. 2 TEU. For an example of judicial review, see the Tobacco
Advertising litigation discussed below.
53. On the Court more generally, see A. Arnull, The European Union and Its Court of Justice,
2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
54. On the general principles of EU law, see in particular T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EC
Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and J. Usher, General Principles of EC
Law (London: Longman, 1998).
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former in certain defined areas. Although the Treaty of Lisbon has brought more
certainty into the delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States,
interpretation of the Treaties will nonetheless continue to give rise to complex
questions of where the boundary lies between legitimate and illegitimate EU action
when sensitive questions of power allocation between different levels of gover-
nance arise. This is all the more so in areas such as obesity prevention which
require a coordinated action in a broad range of policy areas.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFERRAL AND OBESITY PREVENTION
As previously observed, obesity is a multi-factorial condition which can only be
effectively prevented if a multi-sectoral strategy is defined and implemented.
The EU has an important contribution to make and cannot be excluded from,
and may indeed be intrinsic to, the solution to the obesity crisis affecting all its
Member States. Nevertheless, it is not empowered to act alone and adopt all the
measures that are necessary in all the policy areas having an impact on lifestyles
and living environments. It must act within the limits laid down in the Treaties. As
the EU does not have general regulatory powers, the overall approach is bound to
require the involvement of various regulatory levels: the EU as a regional actor, its
twenty-seven Member States acting at national and at local levels, as well as
relevant global actors such as the WHO and the FAO.
The Obesity Prevention White Paper explicitly (and rightly) recognizes the
limits on EU competence by stating that ‘in several areas the main levels for
action are national or local. EU public action in these areas will aim either at
complementing and optimizing actions undertaken at other decision levels be
they national or regional or at addressing issues which per se pertain to [EU]
policies’.55 Nevertheless, some EU policies will be relevant to public health
and have an impact, even if this impact is incidental, on overweight and obesity
prevention. Such policies cannot be overlooked. Consequently, the Commission
distinguishes two roles for the EU in relation to overweight and obesity
prevention:
– the first one is to support interventions taking place at national level; and
– the other is to develop EU policies in such a way that they are able to play a
positive role in combating overweight and obesity.
The rest of this section attempts to delineate what action the EU can take to deal
with the rising rates of overweight and obesity affecting its twenty-seven Member
States, bearing in mind that the principle of conferral requires that the assessment
must be carried out policy area by policy area.
55. Obesity Prevention White Paper, at 3.
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C. OBESITY PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH
As overweight and obesity are regarded as major public health concerns, a good
starting point to assess the regulatory powers the EU enjoys is to consider the tools
which it has at its disposal in the area of health policy. The role of the EU has
evolved in this field. It was only when the TEU was adopted in 1992 that the EU
was formally granted some competence to deal with health matters. Its powers
were further extended by the Amsterdam Treaty. As discussed in detail below, EU
competence in this field is mostly circumscribed to ‘soft law’ measures, that is
measures which are persuasive rather than legally binding. This is not to say that
the EU cannot adopt any binding legislation with a public health component.
Public health requirements must indeed be taken into consideration in all areas
of policy making,56 including the areas of internal market, consumer, agricultural
and transport policies, which are all relevant to the EU’s obesity prevention strat-
egy and in which the EU has the necessary powers to adopt binding legislation.
The insertion of a new title on health in the TFEU (then in the TEC) resulted
from the growing perception that certain health concerns could not be resolved by
Member States acting alone within their own frontiers. Title XIV, which is com-
posed of a single article: Article 168 TFEU, deals exclusively with public health.
As this article is complex and its importance to the developing strategy of the EU
on obesity prevention cannot be overstated, it is quoted in full below.57
Article 168 TFEU (ex-Article 152 EC):
(1) A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition
and implementation of all Union policies and activities. Union action,
which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards
improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and dis-
eases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such
action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promot-
ing research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as
well as health information and education, and monitoring, early warning
of and combating serious cross-border threats to health. The Union shall
complement the Member States’ action in reducing drugs-related health
damage, including information and prevention.
(2) The Union shall encourage cooperation between the Member States in the
areas referred to in this Article and, if necessary, lend support to their
action. It shall in particular encourage cooperation between the Member
States to improve the complementarity of their health services in cross-
border areas. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission,
56. Article 168(1) TFEU, discussed more fully below.
57. On the scope of Art. 168 TFEU, see in particular: T. Hervey & J. McHale, Health Law and the
European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 72; A.P. Van der Mei &
L. Waddington, ‘Public Health and the Treaty of Amsterdam’, European Journal of Health Law
5 (1998): 129.
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coordinate among themselves their policies and programmes in the areas
referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission may, in close contact with the
Member States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination, in
particular initiatives aiming at the establishment of guidelines and indi-
cators, the organization of exchange of best practice, and the preparation
of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The
European Parliament shall be kept fully informed.
(3) The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third
countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of
public health.
(4) By way of derogation from Article 2(5) and Article 6(a) and in accor-
dance with Article 4(2)(k) the European Parliament and the Council,
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives
referred to in this Article through adopting in order to meet common
safety concerns:
(a) measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and
substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives; these mea-
sures shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or intro-
ducing more stringent protective measures;
(b) measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their
direct objective the protection of public health;
(c) measures setting high standards of quality and safety for medicinal
products and devices for medical use.
(5) The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, may also
adopt incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health
and in particular to combat the major cross-border health scourges, mea-
sures concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious
cross-border threats to health, and measures which have as their direct
objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse
of alcohol, excluding any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the
Member States.
(6) The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may also adopt recom-
mendations for the purposes set out in this Article.
(7) Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for
the definition of their health policy and for the organization and delivery
of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member
States shall include the management of health services and medical care
and the allocation of the resources assigned to them.
(8) The measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provi-
sions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood.
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Article 168 TFEU contains several elements deserving closer scrutiny. The anal-
ysis will focus on the following points:
(1) the role of the EU encompasses not only disease prevention but also health
promotion;
(2) the EU is empowered to foster cooperation and lend support to Member
States’ actions, but legislative harmonization at EU level is largely
excluded in the field of public health;
(3) the EU is nonetheless under a duty to mainstream public health concerns
into all EU policies, which requires an in-depth discussion of the rela-
tionship between health protection and other EU policies;
(4) finally, the EU has a duty to foster international cooperation.
The budget of the EU represents only a fraction of levels of public spending in the
Member States. Its redistributive interventions in the field of health are small-scale
in the totality of health spending across the EU as a whole. They may nonetheless
be significant.58
1. From Disease Prevention to Health Promotion
Article 168(1) TFEU provides that EU action in the field of public health ‘shall be
directed towards improving public health, preventing human illness and diseases,
and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health’. Furthermore, ‘such
action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting
research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health
information and health education’. This provision therefore emphasizes that the
scope of public health intervention at EU level should not only cover the preven-
tion of diseases; it should also promote good health, specifically through health
information and education.59 The importance of health promotion is reflected in the
Commission Public Health Programmes.60 It is all the more fundamental in areas
such as obesity prevention, given that the success rate of existing treatments to
manage obesity is low (especially if evaluated in the longer term) and the cost
relatively high, both in individual and societal terms.
It is however necessary that the EU’s obesity prevention strategy also takes
into account the real present and future costs of existing levels of obesity and
related co-morbidities. It should not rely on the premise that somehow by ‘pre-
venting’ obesity – by which we mean lowering the prevalence in the population –
future health costs are avoided. Prevention measures may diminish the prevalence
58. T. Hervey & J. McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004), at 39. See also B. Laffan & M. Shackleton, ‘The Budget’, in H. Wallace &
W. Wallace (eds), Policy-making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000).
59. Gostin uses the term ‘health communication’: L.O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duties
and Restraints (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
60. See Ch. 2 above.
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of obesity but it will not eliminate it, and many of the core costs – in health
infrastructure terms – are necessary whether obesity rates are 5% or 50%. Pro-
motion must always go hand in hand with obesity prevention and cure.
It is often assumed that one way to promote good health is to inform consum-
ers of the food choices available to them and the advantages of a healthy lifestyle.
The role which food information has been given in the EU legal order cannot be
overstated. Chapter 4 below provides a fuller discussion of the assumption that
citizens will make healthy choices if they have sufficient and truthful information
at their disposal on the food they consume to do so. This approach places the
primary responsibility for good health on each citizen. There is an expectation
that each of us will act responsibly by processing the information we are provided
with. This model therefore rests on the assumption that lifestyle habits may durably
be changed.
Beyond its work on food labelling, the Commission has undertaken to finance
public health campaigns aimed at raising awareness of the need both to increase
physical activity levels and to eat more healthily.61 For example, as part of the
campaign to reverse the decline in physical activity levels over the last decades,62
the Commission and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA)
launched, in August 2007, a joint television advertising campaign which aimed
to encourage European citizens to make physical activity part of their daily lives.63
The 30-second advert was supposed to encourage viewers to be physically active,
using the slogan ‘Go on, get out of your armchair’. This advert was aired free of
charge in more than forty European countries during the half-time break of each of
the 2007 season’s 125 televised Champions League football games, and it was
expected to reach between 80 and 100 million viewers during each match week of
the Champions League. This was possible through a partnership with UEFA which
offered up the thirty seconds of airtime that it retained for social initiatives.64
Similarly, the Commission has allocated some of its resources to promote the
consumption of nutritious food. For example, in November 2007, it entered into a
partnership with Euro-Toques International, the European Chefs’ association,
and launched ‘EU Mini-chefs’, a website for children which aimed to contribute
to the fight against child obesity by encouraging healthy eating and cooking.65
61. ‘In cooperation with the Member States and relevant stakeholders, the Commission will develop
and support scientific information and education campaigns to raise awareness of the health
problems related to poor nutrition, overweight and obesity. These campaigns will, in particular,
be addressed to vulnerable groups, such as children’: Obesity Prevention White Paper, at 6.
62. For a more detailed discussion of the role which the EU can play in increasing physical activity
levels in Europe, see Ch. 8 below.
63. The advert Go on Get out of your armchair can be viewed at <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_
determinants/life_style/nutrition/nutrition_uefa_en.html>.
64. Nevertheless, no monitoring was undertaken to assess the impact of this approach and no
evidence has emerged of any greater involvement in physical activity as a result.
65. This website was also used to promote the European Day for Healthy Food and Cooking, which
was celebrated on 8 Nov. 2007, with around 4,000 chefs across the EU showing children how to
cook and eat healthily in schools and restaurants. Finally, through EU Mini-chefs the
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It provided an internet forum on healthy food and cooking for parents, teachers and
children, and included simple healthy recipes and cooking advice. This informa-
tion campaign was aimed above all at children – a population group that must be
encouraged to develop good eating habits at an early age. It was intended to
convince them that eating healthily could be fun and inexpensive. The website
was available in fourteen languages and included an interactive cooking game so
that children could learn by playing.66 More recently, the Commission launched
the ‘Eat it, Drink it, Move it’ campaign intended to give European school children a
chance to take part in educational activities and games, together with an interactive
website, competitions and other events with the aim to change children’s eating
habits for the better.67 More generally, the Commission produces information
material on healthy lifestyles on a dedicated webpage68 and via EU Tube, the You
Tube space of the EU.69
Information campaigns are one tool among others to attempt to address dura-
bly lifestyle habits leading to overweight and obesity. As discussed in more detail
below, the Commission has also facilitated the exchange of best practice in relation
to healthy lifestyle education. Even though information may have a role to play in
influencing lifestyle choices in the long term, it will not suffice to reverse current
trends.70 Policy makers must also ensure that available choices themselves pro-
mote good lifestyle habits. This, in turn, requires that they design policies facil-
itating such choices by changing the obesogenic environment which we live in.
The question thus arises what the EU is empowered to do beyond promoting good
health through education and information campaigns to ensure that we live in
environments where the healthy choice has become an easier choice than it is at
present.
Commission and Euro-Toques International launched a drawing contest for European school-
children. The competition’s theme was: ‘the pleasure of eating well in Europe’. The drawing
that won the contest was used throughout the Union as the poster for the European Day of
Healthy Food and Cooking.
66. During this day, the chefs either visited a local school to carry out workshops or invited a class
into their restaurant for lunch and a chat on healthy cooking. This took place in the seventeen
countries which are members of Euro-Toques International, a European community of chefs
who promote the European cooking heritage and culture. The Euro-Toques International mem-
ber countries are: Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and San
Marino. Around 1,000 schools and 20,000 children were expected to participate in the event.
67. The Campaign was launched on 28 Sep. 2009 and is supported by Belgian tennis champion
Justine Henin and eight-year old Guinness record holder Rosolino Cannio. For more informa-
tion, see <ec.europa.eu/agriculture/tasty-bunch/>.
68. <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/nutrition_en.htm>.
69. <youtube.com/eutube>. The EU has underlined the importance of adapting the communication
channels relied upon to the specific audience(s) targeted, with a preference for virtual tools for
children and young people.
70. For a more thorough discussion on the role which information can play in the EU’s obesity
prevention strategy, see Ch. 4 below on food labelling.
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2. The Union’s Supportive Role in Health Matters
Article 168(5) TFEU excludes legislative harmonization at EU level in the field of
public health, except in narrowly defined areas which are not directly relevant to
obesity prevention.71 An isolated reading of this provision therefore suggests that
EU action is limited in this field to the adoption of soft law measures. EU com-
petence is supportive, that is designed to complement rather than replace Member
State action.72 In other words, the Union is entitled to ‘carry out actions to support,
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States . . . at European
level’,73 but it cannot harmonize them by legislative means.
Even though its scope is necessarily limited, the coordination and support role
of the EU should not be underestimated. The wording of Article 168 TFEU itself
shows that this role may take a variety of forms, as illustrated by the Commission’s
practice in matters relating to overweight and obesity prevention. Apart from the
launch at European level of communication campaigns, the EU can play a role by
financing research and by facilitating discussions and the exchange of best practice
between all interested parties.
a. Obesity Prevention and the Financing
of Research at EU Level
The importance of knowledge-based actions cannot be overstated. To ensure that
the most effective obesity prevention strategies are put in place, research is
paramount and, as Article 168(1) TFEU emphasizes, it should relate to the causes,
the transmission and the prevention of major health scourges. This was reiterated in
the Obesity Prevention White Paper:
The Commission intends to build on the strong foundations laid by previous
research frameworks in the field of nutrition, obesity and the key diseases
caused by unhealthy lifestyles such as cancer, diabetes and respiratory disease.
The Commission has identified the need to know more about the determinants
of food choices, and will establish, under the Seventh Framework Programme,
major strands of research into consumer behaviour; the health impact of food
and nutrition; drivers for preventing obesity in target groups such as infants,
71. Article 168(4) TFEU lists three exceptions to the exclusion of legislative harmonization:
(a) measures on the quality and safety of organs and substances of human origins, blood and
blood derivatives; (b) measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their
direct object the protection of public health; and (c) measures setting high standards of quality
and safety for medicinal products and devices for medical use.
72. On EU supportive (or complementary) competences, see R. Schu¨tze, ‘Co-operative Federalism
Constitutionalized: The Emergence of Complementary Competences in the EC Legal Order’,
European Law Review 31 (2006): 167.
73. Article 6 TFEU. The same holds true of education, vocational training, youth and sport, as well
as culture. See Art. 6(e) and (c) TFEU, and Arts 165 and 167 TFEU. The role of the EU in the
field of education is discussed at the end of this chapter; its role in the field of sport is discussed
in Ch. 8 below.
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children and adolescents, and into effective diet interventions. The
programme will also address health determinants, disease prevention and
health promotion as part of the theme ‘Optimizing the Delivery of Healthcare
to European Citizens’.74
As discussed in Chapter 1 above, the need to invest in good quality research is
particularly pressing in relation to obesity. The urgency stems from the fact that
policy makers face a dilemma: on the one hand, they must act rapidly to reverse
current trends; on the other, our knowledge of the causes of obesity and the best
approaches to its prevention still contains significant gaps which limit our under-
standing of the problem and therefore the confidence of policy makers that policies
will be sound and effective.75
All the EU Member States encounter similar problems, and pooling resources
to increase the knowledge base makes great economic sense. EU intervention thus
undeniably provides the added value which Article 168 TFEU requires.
The money spent on research at EU level comes from the general budget of the
European Union, where it represents some 4% of total EU expenditure. The total
amount is decided for each multi-annual ‘Framework Programme’ according to the
ordinary legislative procedure, whereby the European Parliament and the Council
decide jointly on the priorities and funding of the programme based on a proposal
from the Commission.76 The current programme, the Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7), has a total budget of EUR 50.5 billion for the period 2007–
2013,77 which represents a substantial increase compared to the previous Frame-
work Programme (FP6).78
In light of the fact that obesity has become one of the most pressing public
health issues in Europe, the research budget of the EU has contributed to several
obesity-related projects since 1998,79 and the EU has undertaken to continue to
support obesity research under the FP7 which will provide further scientific data to
advance our understanding of the interaction between food, nutrition and health.
74. Obesity Prevention White Paper, at 8.
75. See Ch. 1 above.
76. For details, see Art. 294 TFEU.
77. FP7 is aimed at helping to put into effect one of the EU’s main goals of increasing the potential
for economic growth and of strengthening European competitiveness by investing in knowl-
edge, innovation and human capital. It is organized in four specific programmes, corresponding
to four major objectives of European research policy: Cooperation, Ideas, People and Capa-
cities. Through these four specific programmes, the goal is to allow the creation of European
poles of excellence within a wide array of scientific themes, ranging from information tech-
nologies, energy and climate change to health, food and social sciences. FP7 also finances direct
research at the Commission’s own research institute, known as the Joint Research Centre.
The activities are focused on three core areas, namely: (1) Food, Chemical Products and Health;
(2) Environment and Sustainability; and (3) Nuclear Safety and Security.
78. 41% at 2004 prices, 63% at 2008 prices.
79. A (non-exhaustive) list of EU-funded projects relating to diabetes and obesity for the periods
1998–2002 (FP5) and 2002–2006 (FP6) is available at <cordis.europa.eu/lifescihealth/major/
diabetes-eu-funding.html>.
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Moreover, the EU also has a budget under its public health programme, which may
be used to finance research concerning obesity prevention.
The projects mentioned in the box below illustrate how the EU has supported
research on obesity prevention through research funding.80 This list does not pur-
port to be exhaustive.
EU Research Policy and Obesity Prevention
Understanding the Role of Genetics in the Obesity Epidemic:
The EU is funding a number of research projects that seek to understand the link
between obesity, nutrition and genetic make-up, and when there is a genetic link
to identify groups at risk. In particular, the DiOGenes (Diet, Obesity and Gene)
project addresses the influence of gene-nutrient interaction on the development
of obesity with a view to determining how much of the obesity crisis is down to
diet and how much is written in people’s genes. It is intended to carry out ‘the
most comprehensive study yet of dietary components and the genetic and beha-
vioural factors influencing weight gain’.81
The EU is also supporting research exploring how our bodies metabolize food
and how they deal with different types of nutrition. Such knowledge is intended
to enhance diets and the nutritional value of food. For example, the NUGENOB
(nutrient-gene interactions in human obesity) project addresses the question
whether some people are more prone to obesity than others. It aims to improve
our understanding of the interaction between fat intake and genetic variations
and functions. After investigating the dietary and lifestyle habits of obese and
lean volunteers from eight European cities, NUGENOB feeds the participants
specially designed high-fat and low-fat diets. It monitors how their bodies
respond and whether this relates to a genetic predisposition to obesity.82
Once a person becomes chronically overweight, their brain interprets reduced
food intake as a threat to survival, reducing metabolic rate, diverting energy to
the maintenance of body composition and, thus, defending existing energy
stores at a ‘set point’. The main goal of the DIABESITY research project is
to identify and validate new targets for obesity treatment and prevention to
regulate this set point. In particular, through studies of human genetics in
obese individuals, researchers from twenty-four European institutions are seek-
ing to identify novel gene linkages with obesity and body composition.83
80. For an overview of all the research projects funded in Key Action 1 ‘Food, Nutrition and Health’
of the Programme Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources within the Fifth
Framework Programme (1998–2002), see <ec.europa.eu/research/quality-of-life/ka1/home_
en.htm>.
81. <www.diogenes-eu.org>.
82. <www.nugenob.com>.
83. <www.eurodiabesity.org>.
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Obesity Prevention:
The EU-funded EXGENESIS (Health benefits of exercise: identification of
genes and signalling pathways involved in effects of exercise on insulin resis-
tance, obesity and the metabolic syndrome) project is working to provide a
better understanding of the molecular mechanisms involved in the protective
effects of exercise and a healthy diet. Recent scientific advances have high-
lighted the role of signalling pathways and changes in gene expression in muscle
and other tissues through which the beneficial effects of exercise arise. The aim
of EXGENESIS is to establish a major European consortium that can capitalize
on these advances, converting them into new measures for prevention and
treatment of type 2 diabetes. Results could include innovative medicines, or
more efficient approaches towards healthier lifestyles, especially with respect to
diet and exercise. EXGENESIS is a consortium of twenty-seven partners from
thirteen Member States, supported through Priority 1 (Life Sciences, Genomics
and Biotechnology for Health) of FP6.84
A Specific Focus on Children and Adolescents:
In light with the recognition that childhood obesity tends to lead to adult obesity,
the EU has funded projects focusing on children and adolescents.
What mothers eat during pregnancy and what they feed their babies is vital to
their growth and well-being. Some may also be aware that nutrition in these
early stages will influence their children’s health and capabilities as adults.
Recent studies have backed this view. In one study, improved early nutrition
and infant weight led to a sharp reduction in high blood pressure among adults.
Involving scientists from thirty-eight institutions in sixteen European countries,
EARNEST (Early Nutrition Programming Project) is finding ways public health
practices can influence foetal and infant nutrition to reduce the prevalence of
certain conditions, including obesity, in later life and to improve the develop-
ment of the brain and social skills. It is funded under the Food Quality and
Safety Priority of the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technical
Development of the European Union. The EU is contributing EUR 13.4 million
towards a total cost of EUR 16.5 million.85
The high-speed biological race towards adulthood that takes place during
adolescence carries massive long-term implications. As a result, dietary and
lifestyle choices made at this sensitive age can affect people for the rest of their
lives. The HELENA (Healthy Lifestyle in Europe by Nutrition in Adoles-
cence) project is intended to provide comparable data on food intake, dietary
preferences and physical activity among European teenagers of both sexes.
It will use this information to develop a lifestyle education programme for
84. <dundee.ac.uk/lifesciences/exgenesis/>.
85. <www.metabolic-programming.org>.
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adolescents, as well as healthy new foods. The work takes place with the
financial support of the European Union within the Sixth Framework Project.
The EU is contributing nearly EUR 5 million towards a total cost of EUR 6.72
million.86
It is of paramount importance that the research undertaken on behalf of the EU is
sufficiently independent, objective and impartial to guarantee its value as a guide to
develop effective obesity prevention policies. Several stakeholders have vested
interests which arguably do not make them the ideal research partners in matters
of obesity prevention. Subsequent chapters will illustrate some of the problems,
which have been encountered in key areas, including nutrition labelling,87 food
marketing to children,88 food reformulation89 or food taxes.90
b. Obesity Prevention and the Exchange
of Best Practice at EU Level
Measures intended to facilitate the exchange of best practice can take a variety of
forms. They include the establishment of discussion fora (through the establish-
ment of networks of experts, the organization of conferences or the establishment
of platforms for action), as well as the publication of guidelines and policy
recommendations.91
The role of the exchange of best practice has grown in EU law with the advent
of supportive (also referred to as complementary) EU competence. It is therefore
not surprising that the two Public Health Programmes insist on the role the
exchange of best practice can play in gathering and disseminating health informa-
tion and measuring the effectiveness of certain actions. More specifically, the
Obesity Prevention White Paper attaches great weight to soft law mechanisms.
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, the Commission supports, in line with the recom-
mendations of the WHO, a multi-stakeholder, partnership approach. Consequently,
it has set up various discussion fora, including the EU Platform and the High Level
Group, as part of the EU’s developing obesity prevention strategy, thus inviting
Member States and other stakeholders to meet on a regular basis with a view to
sharing their experiences, voicing their doubts and discussing how policies could
best evolve to tackle overweight and obesity. The EU added value of such an
approach consists in particular in avoiding fragmentation by centralizing existing
knowledge and policy responses relating to a public health concern which is
86. <www.helenastudy.com>.
87. See Ch. 4 above.
88. See Ch. 5 above.
89. See Ch. 6 above.
90. See Ch. 7 above.
91. On the EU’s reliance on soft law, see L. Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
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common to all Member States. The Commission can act as a catalyst for the
dissemination of knowledge and is in a better position than individual Member
States to identify knowledge gaps, deepen our understanding of overweight and
obesity and of the policy responses most likely to prevent them effectively and lead
to the development of guidelines where consensus may be reached at EU level.92
A Case Study: From the EPODE Programme to the EEN
The EPODE Programme (Ensemble Pre´venons l’Obe´site´ Des Enfants) is a
community intervention action plan that sets out a prevention model based
on the involvement of the local community for its benefit. Its key objective
is to help prevent overweight and obesity trends in young children and adoles-
cents and promote healthy lifestyles by conveying a broader vision of the ben-
efits of a balanced diet and or regular physical activity.
This model is based on the sustainable mobilization of local key players (tea-
chers, health care professionals, sports teachers, early years professionals, shop-
keepers, restaurateurs) taking part in a health drive aiming at giving families the
desire and means to adapt their lifestyles to a less obesogenic environment.
The implementation of the EPODE Programme relies on five basic principles:
– the sustainable involvement of local stakeholders;
– the political support of elected officials;
– the involvement of scientists for content and assessment;
– a public-private sector partnership; and
– the expertise of Prote´ines, a project engineering social marketing
agency.
The geographical scope of the EPODE programme has expanded. EPODE’s
long-term intervention pilot programme (the Fleurbaix Laventie Ville Sante´
study) was conducted between 1992 and 2004 in the two French Northern
towns of Fleurbaix and Laventie with of a total population of 6,600 in 1991
and then became the EPODE programme in 2004. EPODE is now developed in
France, in Belgium and in Spain.
In France, as of 2009, 167 towns (including the ten towns for the 2004 pilot
project) are covered by the project, targeting around 1.2 million people.93
In 2005, the Mayors of the towns participating in the EPODE programme
created an association intended to extend the programme to towns interested
and to create a network of the Mayors of EPODE towns united by the common
goal of reversing childhood obesity trends and informing their inhabitants about
the advantages of a healthy lifestyle.
92. For example, see Ch. 8 below for the EU Guidelines on Physical Activity published in
November 2008.
93. <www.epode.fr>.
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In Belgium, the project initially started with two pilot towns.94 The programme
was launched in January 2007 under the name of ‘Via Sano’. Six new towns and
municipalities in three different communities joined the Programme in 2008,95
together with two new partners: the Belgian Society of Pediatrics and the
Flemish Association of Diabetics.
In Spain, where the EPODE Programme was launched in March 2007 under the
name ‘Thao’, five pilot towns were involved in the activities. In September
2008, more than twenty-five new towns had joined the Programme and the aim
was for sixty Spanish cities to be implementing the Thao programme, targeting
more than 120,000 children. The implementation of the Thao Programme is
managed by the Agency Newton 21, with expertise in health and social mar-
keting. New tools have been developed and a campaign has been organized by
the current pilot-towns in order to advertise the programme and extend its
geographical coverage.96
Non-EU Member States have also expressed an interest in EPODE, notably in
Canada and Australia.
In line with its commitment to involve all sectors of society, both in the public
and private domains, in its obesity prevention strategy, DG SANCO supported
the launch of the EPODE European Network (the EEN), with a view to extend-
ing these projects and to providing a more formal structure for sharing best prac-
tices, in particular to allow for a wider application of the EPODE Programme.
The EEN is financed by public-private partnerships. The EU Confederation
of the Food and Drink Industries (CIAA) has undertaken to institutionally
support the development of both the EPODE programme at national level via
collaboration among national food and drink industry associations, individual
companies and other relevant stakeholders. For example, Nestle´ has undertaken
to give EUR 250,000 to EPODE in France, EUR 126,000 to the Thao
programme in Spain and EUR 150,000 to the EEN for the period 2008–2010.
Nestle´ employees also participated in EPODE events. The Ferrero Group, Mars
Inc. and Carrefour have also contributed to the EEN and national programmes.
Notwithstanding the support which the EPODE Programme and the EEN have
received to date, one is tempted to question certain of their features. In the first
place, one should note that the EPODE Programme and the EEN only operate in
selective locations and therefore cannot be considered as fully-fledged national
strategic approaches. Secondly, the EPODE Programme and the EEN are
heavily sponsored by funds originating from the major players in the food
industry whose marketing for unhealthy food affect far more children than
94. <www.viasano.be>.
95. Marche-en-Famenne (community of Luxembourg), Lontzen, la Calamine, Raeren, Eupen
(German speaking community), Jette (Brussels’ area).
96. <www.thaosalud.com>.
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the number of children benefiting from the EPODE Programme and the EEN.
In particular, one may wonder whether it is appropriate to entrust the public
relations company Prote´ines, whose clients include McDonald’s, Kellogg’s,
Ferrero and Danone, with a public health mission that would arguably be better
carried out by public authorities.97
Even though they may be valuable, supportive measures are inherently limited.
They are not legally binding and their implementation depends on the goodwill of
stakeholders. It is true that the obligation resting on each EU Platform member to
make commitments and their monitoring, with the risk of being excluded if one
fails to put forward at least one commitment, is likely to increase the effectiveness
of the EU Platform. Members are also keen to avoid adverse publicity which the
participation in a public forum such as the EU Platform may entail. Nevertheless,
there are certain fields of action for which a certain degree of coercion seems
unavoidable to ensure that effective progress is made and that obesity trends
have a chance to be reversed – and this is particularly true when conflicts of interest
are unavoidable.98 The EU Platform is nonetheless viewed as a laboratory for
policy making, and it has served as the model for the EU Alcohol and Health
Forum.99
Exchanging best practice is intended to allow the EU either to act when it does
not have any legislative powers at its disposal or to evaluate whether legislation is
both feasible and desirable in areas where it does have such powers. Thus,
exchanging best practice is either the only means of action available or a
preliminary step to further integration. In any event, best practice must be deter-
mined on the basis of expert evidence and long-term experience, not on the basis of
hunches and assumptions.100
3. The Duty to Mainstream Health Concerns
into All EU Policies
An isolated reading of Article 168(5) TFEU could convey a false impression of the
extent of the powers which the Union has at its disposal in the area of public health,
97. For example, one can read on the Prote´ines website: ‘How does McDonald’s assimilate the
nutritional balance of the 21st century food consumer? McDonald’s optimizes its product
offering, explains it to all of its audiences and creates new relationships with them’,
<proteines.fr/-content-?id_article¼134&debut_articles¼6>. Or: ‘For Kinder, Nutella . . .
more than ever, the right to enjoyment must be asserted in an age that too often prefers
prohibition to education. Ferrero defends this right and replaces greed in its emotional, social
and educational context’, <proteines.fr/-content-?id_article¼135&debut_articles¼6>.
98. The issue is discussed more fully in Ch. 5 below on the regulation of food marketing to
children.
99. The EU Alcohol and Health Forum was launched in June 2007, <ec.europa.eu/health/alcohol/
forum/index_en.htm>.
100. In particular, it may be that what works in one Member State may not work as well in another
Member State.
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and obesity prevention more specifically. If Article 168(5) prevents the EU from
adopting legislation as part of its health policy, Article 168(1) nonetheless man-
dates that ‘a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition
and implementation of all Union policies and activities’.101 Health protection must
therefore be considered in all fields of Union action, and health interests taken into
account when pursuing potentially competing goals in other policy areas, some of
which will grant them powers to adopt binding regulatory norms. In EU jargon,
one would say that Article 168(1) requires that EU institutions should mainstream
health concerns into all fields of EU competence.
Many of the Union’s policies and actions have an impact on health across
Europe. As the Commission has pointed out, these policies are often developed
with a different policy logic in mind and decision makers may not be well aware of
their potential health effects.102 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1 above, obesity
is a multi-factorial disease which cannot be remedied by health policy alone; there
is a need for coordinated actions involving a variety of environmental, social or
economic policies. Mainstreaming public health concerns into all EU policies is
therefore crucial if overweight and obesity are to be addressed effectively.
a. Mainstreaming Public Health into all EU Policies
It is with a view to implementing the Union’s mainstreaming obligation that the
Council emphasized, in its Conclusions of 8 June 1999, the necessity to integrate
health protection requirements in all EU policies.103 Since then, the EU has
produced various documents on the need to develop a comprehensive and coherent
public health policy.104 As discussed in Chapter 2 above, several areas of EU
action are relevant to obesity prevention; they include audiovisual policy, con-
sumer policy, internal market policy, agricultural policy, transport policy . . . Their
relevance results from the fact that obesity is interdisciplinary and requires a
coherent multi-sectoral intervention if it is to be fully effective. It is therefore
not surprising that since the Obesity Prevention White Paper was published in
May 2007, one can find references to health concerns, and obesity prevention
more specifically, in documents produced by other Commission DG than
101. It is noteworthy that the Lisbon Treaty has upheld the strengthened obligation brought about by
the Amsterdam Treaty in Art. 152(1) EC and now contained in Art. 168(1) TFEU from a
requirement to ‘contribute’ to ensuring a high level of human health protection under (what
used to be) Art. 129 EC pre-Amsterdam to the duty to ‘ensure’ a high level of health protection
in all [EU] activities.
102. See the Commission’s webpage on ‘Health in all policies’: <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/
other_policies/health_other_policies_en.htm>.
103. OJ 1999 C195/4.
104. Several of these measures are discussed in Ch. 2 above. See in particular the Council Resolu-
tion of 14 Dec. 2000, which stressed the importance of nutrition as a key determinant of human
health and focused on integrating nutritional health not only into the programme of EU action
in the field of public health, but also into other EU policies with an impact on nutritional
health: OJ 2001 C20/1.
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DG SANCO.105 To improve coordination and integration of health protection
within the Commission services, a Health Inter-Service Group involving represen-
tatives from most Commission DG is chaired by DG SANCO, and meets every six
months. This group allows different Commission services to present work in their
areas of responsibility which could have a health impact, and also allows DG
SANCO to share its own work with other Commission departments.
Mainstreaming public health concerns into all EU policies should involve a
proactive approach rather than a reactive approach relying solely on the CJEU to
review already adopted EU law and ensure that it complies with Article 168 TFEU.
As Olivier De Schutter has remarked, ‘mainstreaming should be seen as operating
ex ante rather than post hoc: it influences the way legislation and public policies are
conceived and different alternative paths compared to one another; it does not
simply require that such legislation and policies do not violate fundamental rights.
It is pro-active, rather than reactive’.106 More fundamentally, mainstreaming
implies, at its core, that a high level of public health should not be pursued only
via ear-marked, distinct policies, but must be incorporated in all the fields of law-
and policy-making. One could therefore draw an analogy with Olivier De Schut-
ter’s argument on fundamental rights: ‘fundamental rights, thus, should be seen, as
an integral part of all public policy making and implementation, not something that
is separated off in a policy or institutional ghetto. Mainstreaming is transversal or
horizontal’.107 Assessing the impact of policies on public health requires, in turn,
that a careful balancing exercise is carried out between competing interests at every
stage of the policy-making process, from the first Commission proposal, to the
adoption by the Council and the European Parliament of the measure, to its appli-
cation by all parties to which the measure in question is addressed. The practical
difficulties involved in assessing how best a high level of public health protection
could be ensured should not stop the EU from taking the mainstreaming obligation
laid down in Article 168 TFEU seriously into account – the problem is to design an
effective and transparent mechanism to ensure that this constitutional obligation is
duly upheld.
b. The Role of Health Impact Assessments
To assist the development of evidence-based policies, the EU should rely more
systematically on health impact assessments. This finds support not only in
Article 168(1) and Article 114(3) TFEU which mandate a high level of health
105. See, for example, the first part of Ch. 7 below dealing with the CAP reform of the fruit and
vegetable market.
106. O. De Schutter, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights in the European Union’, in P. Alston & O. De
Schutter (eds), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU: The Contribution of the
Fundamental Rights Agency (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at 44.
107. Ibid., citing C. McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland’,
Fordham International Law Journal (1999): 1696.
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protection in all EU policies, but also in the 2004 Commission Report on Enabling
Good Health for All: A Reflection Process for a New EU Health Strategy:
The time has come for health to be put at the centre of EU policy making.
If the EU is to help its citizens achieve good health, it must address the
behavioural, social and environmental factors that determine health.
This involves understanding better how different issues and policies affect
health. To do this, the EU needs an effective Health impact assessment system.
This could play an important role in both mainstreaming health and evaluating
how other policies affect health. But how could such a system operate in
practice?
We need to ensure that health is at the very heart of policy making at
regional, national and EU level. We need to promote health through all
policies. Policy measures as different as inner city development, regional
transport infrastructure, applied research, air pollution, or international trade
must take health into account. Health needs to be integrated into all policies,
from agriculture to environment, from transport to trade, from research to
humanitarian aid and development.108
More recently, the Second Public Health Programme 2008–2013 reiterated the
importance of health in all EU policies: ‘the Programme should support the main-
streaming of health objectives in all [EU] policies and activities, without dupli-
cating work carried out under other [EU] policies’.109
All major policy initiatives with a potential economic, social and/or environ-
mental impact require an integrated impact assessment. This applies in particular to
most legislation (proposed directives or regulations) and to White Papers, action
plans, expenditure programmes and negotiating guidelines for international
agreements.110 The aim of integrated impact assessments is to ensure that a pro-
posal is sustainable by looking at the broad range of potential economic, social and
environmental impacts. The Commission has published a series of impact assess-
ment guidelines which are intended to give general guidance to the Commission
108. <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/Documents/pub_good_health_en.pdf>, at para. 4.1.
Emphasis in bold in the original text; emphasis in italics added. The importance of health
impact assessments has since been reiterated by the Council in its Conclusions on Health in All
Policies of 30 Nov. and 1 Dec. 2006, which, after citing Art. 152 EC (now Art. 168 TFEU),
called upon the EU, its Member States and the European Parliament ‘to ensure the visibility
and value of health in the development of EU legislation and policies by, inter alia, health
impact assessments’, <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_projects/2005/action1/docs/2005_1_18_frep_
a8_en.pdf>, at para. 13.
109. Decision 1350/2007 establishing a Second Programme of [EU] Action in the Field of Health
(2008–2013), OJ 2007 L301/3, at Recital 12 of the Preamble. See also at para. 25: ‘the
precautionary principle and risk assessment are key factors for the protection of human health
and should therefore be part of further integration into other [EU] policies and activities.’
110. The Commission has completed over 400 impact assessments since 2002 when the impact
assessment system was put in place. The list is available at <ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/
ia_carried_out/ia_carried_out_en.htm>.
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services for assessing potential impacts of different policy options. The latest
guidelines were issued in January 2009.111
Unfortunately, public health is not singled out: it falls within the broader
category of ‘social impact’.112 There is therefore a risk that a proposal with a
broad range of social impacts fails to consider specifically potential health
impacts.113 The constitutional obligation of EU institutions to ensure a high level
of health in all EU policies warrants that health should become a separate require-
ment for consideration. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that impact assessments
are used to inform policy decisions, rather than to justify a preferred policy option
determined independently from the impact assessment process.114 This is all the
more important if policy is to rely on evidence rather than on assumptions or, even
worse, prejudice.115
Monitoring the effectiveness of policies ex post is a valuable, even an
essential, exercise. Nevertheless, anticipating the consequences of policies ex ante
on the basis of solid impact assessments will increase their chances of success at a
much earlier stage.
c. Public Health and EU Internal Market Policy
The rest of this section explores more specifically the relationship between the
internal market and public health, insofar as this issue has given rise to vivid
controversies and illustrates the practical difficulties involved in attempting to
delineate the scope and the nature of EU powers. It will also provide an opportunity
to present what the rationale for the internal market is, bearing in mind that it is a
core EU policy and has an important role to play in the EU’s developing obesity
prevention strategy.
The internal market has always been central to the EU legal order. It is defined
in Article 26(2) TFEU (ex-Article 14 EC) as an area in which the free movement of
goods, services, people and capital shall be ensured in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Treaties.116 Its rationale is that the broader the market, the more choice
for consumers and the more opportunities for businesses. To ensure the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market, the EU has relied upon two com-
plementary forms of integration.
111. <ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission_guidelines/commission_guidelines_en.htm>.
112. Public health is listed as a sub-category of possible social impacts: see the list in Table 2 of the
2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 35.
113. A study conducted by the National Heart Forum found that in 2005 and 2006, 73 out of the 137
impact assessments carried out by the Commission did not mention the word ‘health’.
R. Salay & P. Lincoln, The European Union and Health Impact Assessments: Are They an
Unrecognized Statutory Obligation? (London: National Heart Forum, September 2008), at 13.
114. Information Note from the President to the Commission, ‘Better Regulation and Enhanced
Impact Assessment’, 28 Jun. 2007, SEC (2007) 926.
115. For a discussion on the widely held, but nonetheless mistaken, view that obesity and over-
weight are caused by a lack of goodwill, see Ch. 1 above in fine.
116. These freedoms are often referred to as the Four Freedoms or the Four Fundamental Freedoms.
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In the first place, the TFEU contains general clauses requiring Member States
to suppress obstacles to free movement. This approach relies on deregulation: the
barriers to free movement imposed by Member States are dismantled to facilitate
free movement. Nevertheless, free movement cannot be unlimited, and provision
has been made in the TFEU to ensure that overriding requirements of public interest,
including public health, are sufficiently protected. Member States may therefore
invoke public health considerations to derogate from the principle of free move-
ment, provided that the restrictions they impose on free movement are necessary
and the least possible restrictive of trade. For example, the protection of children
may justify restrictions regarding the timing and the content of advertising.117
This form of integration is often referred to as ‘negative integration’.
The second mechanism intended to facilitate free movement is referred to as
‘positive integration’. It consists in two phases: first the abolition of barriers to
trade (deregulation), followed by the adoption of a common EU standard (re-
regulation). For example, the free movement of foodstuffs is likely to be facilitated
if one set of food labelling rules agreed at EU level replaces the twenty-seven
different sets of rules applying to food labelling in the twenty-seven Member
States. The harmonization process is however not always as straightforward as
suggested. If EU legislation sometimes replaces national standards, it may some-
times replace national standards in part only (partial harmonization); or it may
allow Member States to adopt more stringent standards than the standards laid
down at EU level (minimum harmonization). It is therefore paramount to deter-
mine precisely the scope of EU acts – though this exercise may turn out to be
extremely difficult in practice.118
Article 114 TFEU (ex-Article 95 EC) is the key provision granting the powers
to the EU to adopt the measures necessary for the approximation of the provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have
as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.119 From a
formal point of view, measures may be adopted on the basis of Article 114 by QMV
only, that is without the need for the unanimous agreement of the Member States.
The ordinary legislative procedure also applies in that both the Council and the
European Parliament must reach a common decision. From a substantive point of
view, measures may be adopted on the basis of Article 114 only if they have as their
object the establishment or functioning of the internal market. The former
alternative concerns obstacles to trade between Member States; the latter
alternative captures distortions of competition resulting from disparities between
national laws.120 This said the question remains of the exact contours of Article 114
TFEU.
117. See Art. 36 (goods) and Arts 52 and 62 (persons and services) TFEU as interpreted in Case
C-34/95 De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843. This question is discussed in detail in Ch. 5 below.
118. See Ch. 5 below for a discussion of the EU’s different harmonization techniques.
119. Article 114(1) TFEU.
120. See R. Schu¨tze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 144.
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In particular, and bearing in mind that free movement is not unlimited, the
question arises how health concerns and other concerns of public interest should be
taken into account in the internal market harmonization process. Article 114(3)
itself echoes Article 168(1) and states that the EU legislature, when acting on the
basis of Article 114(1), should take as a base a high level of health and consumer
protection. It is therefore necessary to determine how conflicts between free move-
ment and public health or other overriding objectives of public interest should be
resolved, bearing in mind that Article 168(5) excludes the legislative harmoniza-
tion at EU level of national rules on public health.
The boundaries between what falls within and what falls outside the scope of
EU powers under Article 114 TFEU have proven extremely difficult to draw in
practice, as the Court of Justice confirmed in its seminal Tobacco Advertising
ruling in October 2000.
d. The Scope of EU Powers in the Case Law
of the Court of Justice
The constitutional significance of the Tobacco Advertising case cannot be
overstated.121 For the first time the Court annulled an EU measure for lack of
EU competence. This judgment and subsequent case law are therefore discussed
in some detail. This section concludes with a discussion of the extent to which
analogies may be drawn between the regulation of tobacco advertising and the
regulation of food advertising and what lessons can be learnt for the Union’s
developing obesity prevention strategy.
i. The First Tobacco Advertising Case
In July 1998, the European Parliament and the Council adopted, on the basis of
what is now Article 114 TFEU, a directive approximating the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States and laying down a general prohi-
bition on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products.122 Germany voted
against the directive in Council; however, it was outvoted by the other Member
States following a QMV in favour of its adoption. Germany subsequently chal-
lenged its validity, arguing – among others – that the EU did not have the required
competence to adopt such a measure. More specifically, it contended that the 1998
directive was in reality a disguised public health measure whose effects on the
internal market, if any, were purely incidental, thus preventing Article 114 TFEU
from providing a proper legal basis.
The Court of Justice accepted Germany’s argument and annulled the 1998
directive. It held that Article 114 TFEU was intended to improve the conditions for
the establishment and functioning of the internal market, as opposed to vesting in
the EU legislature a general power to regulate the internal market. This clearly
121. Case C-376/98 Germany v. Council and the European Parliament [2000] ECR I-8419
(hereafter ‘Tobacco Advertising I’).
122. Directive 98/43, OJ 1998 L213/9.
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confirms that the scope of Article 114 TFEU is not unlimited: this would not only
be contrary to the express wording of the provisions but it would also be
incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 5 TEU that the powers of
the EU are limited to those specifically conferred upon it.123 Thus, it is only if a
measure genuinely seeks to improve the conditions for the establishment and
functioning of the internal market that Article 114 TFEU can be invoked. If a
mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of obsta-
cles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition liable
to result there from were sufficient to justify the choice of Article 114 TFEU as a
legal basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper legal basis might be
rendered nugatory. The Court of Justice would then be prevented from discharging
the function entrusted to it by Article 19 TEU of ensuring that the law is observed in
the interpretation and application of the Treaties.124
The Court of Justice then considered whether, on the facts of the case, the 1998
directive contributed: (1) to the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of
goods and the freedom to provide services; or (2) to the elimination of distortions
of competition. It concluded that it did not.
On the first limb of its analysis, the Court of Justice assessed the general
prohibition of advertising of tobacco products. It accepted that Article 114
TFEU could be used to prevent the emergence of future obstacles to trade resulting
from multifarious development of national laws. Nevertheless, the emergence of
such obstacles must be likely and the measure in question must be designed to
prevent them.125 The Court accepted that the prohibition of tobacco advertising in
press products could be justified on the ground that the different national rules in
place could constitute a likely obstacle to trade between Member States in these
products. By contrast, it did not accept that the prohibition on all forms of adver-
tising laid down in Article 3 of the Directive could be validly adopted on the basis
of Article 114 on the ground that they hindered intra-EU trade. In particular, the
Court noted that advertising on posters, parasols, ashtrays and other articles used in
hotels (i.e., static advertising), as well as advertising spots in cinemas, were not
related to inter-State trade: there is neither an existing market nor a likely future
market in such products.126 Mere disparities in national rules are not sufficient to
123. At para. 83. As this judgment was issued before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, it
refers to the principle of conferral as ‘principle of attributed competence’ which was embodied
in Art. 5 TEC.
124. At para. 84.
125. At para. 86. On the comparison of the Tobacco Advertising judgment with previous rulings of
the Court of Justice, see R. Schu¨tze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing
Structure of European Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 147.
126. The Court of Justice also noted that the 1998 directive did not ensure the free movement of
products that complied with its provisions in light of the minimum harmonization clause which
it contained in Art. 5 and which allowed Member States to extend stricter national health
standards to imports from other Member States. On minimum harmonization, see Ch. 5 below.
For a discussion of the relationship between minimum harmonization and general Treaty
provisions, see M. Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’, Common
Market Law Review 37 (2000): 853 and, more recently, M. Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization
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empower the EU to adopt harmonizing legislation on the basis of Article 114
TFEU.
Secondly, as regards the elimination of distortions of competition, the Court of
Justice held that the effects of the advantages accruing to agencies and manufac-
turers of advertising products established in Member States whose legislation was
not restrictive were not appreciable. Those effects were not comparable to the
distortions of competition caused by differences in production costs. Moreover,
the imposition of a wide-ranging prohibition on the advertising of tobacco products
was tantamount, in the Court’s view, to limiting, in all the Member States, the
means available for economic operators to enter or remain in the market. The Court
nonetheless considered that the Treaty provisions on the internal market would
have allowed the adoption of measures imposing a partial prohibition on certain
forms of advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. In relation to sponsor-
ship specifically, it observed that differences between certain national regulations
on tobacco advertising, such as the fact that sponsorship was prohibited in some
Member States and authorized in others, had given rise to certain sports events
being relocated, with considerable repercussions on the conditions of competition
for undertakings associated with such events.127
Finally, as regards the relationship between the internal market and public
health, the Court of Justice clearly stated that the national measures to be harmo-
nized by the 1998 directive were ‘to a large extent’ public health measures, and that
legislative harmonization at EU level was explicitly excluded in this field.128 It
stressed that the legal basis should not be determined to ‘circumvent the express
exclusion of harmonization’ under Article 168(5) TFEU.129 Nevertheless, it also
pointed out that such exclusion did not mean that harmonizing measures based on
other Treaty provisions could not have an impact on public health, since the latter
had to form a constituent part of other EU policies, as confirmed by the third
paragraph of Article 114 TFEU.130 If the conditions for recourse to this article
had been fulfilled, it would have constituted an adequate legal basis. As stated
above, this was however not the case on the facts, and the 1998 directive had to be
annulled.131
after Tobacco Advertising and Laval Un Partneri’, in M. Bulterman et al. (eds), Views of
European Law from the Mountain: Liber Amicorum for Piet Jan Slot (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2009), at 3.
127. At paras 106–113.
128. At para. 76.
129. At para. 79.
130. At para. 78.
131. AG Fennelly emphasized that the content of a harmonization measure also had to be, in
principle, influenced by substantive concerns such as public health, as required under
Art. 114(3) and Art. 168(1) TFEU: ‘the obvious concern with public health which motivated
the initial, disparate national advertising restrictions in some Member States, and the policy
chosen by the [EU] legislature, evidently on the basis of similar concerns, do not per se lead to
any doubt, to my mind about the competence of the [EU] to adopt an internal market measure.
That fact alone does not show either that the [EU] has invaded a domain reserved exclusively
to the Member States or that the objective of the measure is health protection to the exclusion
of all other aims’ (at para. 66 of the Opinion).
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This judgment should not be interpreted as suggesting that it is only if a
measure has, as its primary objective, the proper functioning of the internal market,
that it can validly be adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. As stated above, the
Union’s harmonization powers are more extensive in the area of health than
Article 168(5) may suggest. Provided that EU harmonizing measures adopted
on the basis of Article 114 have an impact on the functioning of the internal market,
then recourse to Article 114 is legitimate and such measures are valid.132
The mainstreaming obligation contained in both Article 114(3) and Article 168(5)
TFEU confirms that, provided a measure is not exclusively concerned with public
health protection and the EU legislature’s intention is not to ‘circumvent the
express exclusion of harmonization’ laid down in Article 168(5), then this
measure may be adopted on the basis of Article 114 if the conditions for resorting
to this article have been satisfied. This analysis has been confirmed in subsequent
cases. For example, in Alliance for Natural Health, the Court observed that
‘provided that the conditions for recourse to [Article 114 TFEU] as a legal basis
are fulfilled, the [EU] legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal
basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices
to be made’.133
ii. The Follow-Up to the First Tobacco Advertising Case
In May 2003, the European Parliament and the Council adopted another directive
on the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products which prohibits:
– first, the advertising of tobacco products in the press and other printed
publications, in information society services (such as the Internet) and in
radio broadcasts;134
– secondly, the sponsorship of radio programmes by tobacco companies;135
and
– thirdly, the sponsorship of events or activities having cross-border
effects.136
132. In other words, the centre of gravity approach [which means that recourse to a certain legal
basis is barred if the main emphasis, the centre of gravity, of a measure lies on a point which is
not covered by that specific legal basis] does not have any role to play in cases where the
choice is between [EU] or Member State competence, as this approach is only relevant where
there is a dispute as to whether a measure should have been adopted by reference to one or
other of two possible competing legal bases. In Tobacco Advertising I, the issue was not so
much whether a choice existed between two areas of EU competence within which the con-
tested directive fell, but rather whether the EU was competent at all to adopt this directive. On
this point, see paras 67–69 of AG Fennelly’s Opinion.
133. Joined Cases C-154 and 155/04 Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, at para. 30.
See also B. De Witte, ‘Non-Market Values in Internal Market Legislation’, in N. Nic Shuibhne
(ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), at 61.
134. Directive 2033/33, OJ 2003 L152/16, in Arts 3 and 4.
135. Ibid., in Art. 4.
136. Ibid., in Art. 5.
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Only publications intended for professionals in the tobacco trade and publications
from non-EU countries which are not principally intended for the EU market are
exempted.137
This second directive was also adopted by QMV on the basis of what is now
Article 114 TFEU (ex-Article 95 EC). Once again, Germany, which was outvoted
in Council, challenged its validity and argued (among other things) that it did not
contribute to the elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods or to the
removal of appreciable distortions of competition. This time, the Court dismissed
the action as unfounded and held that the conditions required for recourse to
Article 114 TFEU as a suitable legal basis were in fact met.138
The Court of Justice noted that the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco
products were dealt with differently from one Member State to another, and that
there was an appreciable risk that the differences would increase as a result of
the enlargement of the EU to ten new Member States, thus warranting an EU
intervention.139
The Court then focused on whether Article 114 TFEU provided an adequate
legal basis for such intervention. It ruled that the market in press products and the
radio market were markets in which trade between Member States was relatively
sizeable and was set to grow further as a result, in particular, of the link between the
media in question and the internet, which is the cross-border medium par excel-
lence.140 The same finding was made as regards sponsorship of radio programmes
by tobacco companies. Differences between national rules had already emerged on
the date when the 2003 directive was adopted or were about to emerge and those
differences were liable to impede the freedom to provide services by denying radio
broadcasting bodies established in a Member State where a measure prohibiting
sponsorship was in force the benefit of sponsorship from tobacco companies estab-
lished in another Member State, where such a measure did not exist.141 Further-
more, those differences also meant that there was an appreciable risk of distortions
of competition.142 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice added that it was not
necessary also to prove distortions of competition in order to justify recourse to
Article 114 TFEU once the existence of obstacles to trade had been established.143
The requirements are alternative, not cumulative.
The Court of Justice finally turned to the more specific question whether
Articles 3 and 4 of the 2003 directive were in fact designed to eliminate or prevent
obstacles to the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide services or to
remove distortions of competition. The adoption of a prohibition on the advertising
of tobacco products in periodicals, magazines and newspapers, which is designed
137. Ibid., in Art. 3(1).
138. Case C-380/03 Germany v. Council and the European Parliament [2006] ECR I-11573
(hereafter ‘Tobacco Advertising II’).
139. Ibid., at paras 46–51.
140. Ibid., at para. 53. For a fuller discussion, see paras 54–64.
141. Ibid., at para. 65.
142. Ibid., at para. 66.
143. Ibid., at para. 67.
Chapter 3
82
to apply uniformly throughout the EU, is intended to prevent trade between Mem-
ber States in press products from being impeded by the national rules of one or
other Member State. Moreover, the fact that Article 3 of the 2003 directive
expressly permits the insertion of advertising for tobacco products in certain pub-
lications, in particular in those which are intended exclusively for professionals
in the tobacco trade, confirms that the directive is intended to facilitate free
movement.144 The Court of Justice concluded that Articles 3 and 4 of the 2003
directive did in fact have as their object the improvement of the conditions for the
functioning of the internal market and, therefore, that they were able to be adopted
on the basis of Article 114 TFEU. It added:
This conclusion is not called into question by the applicant’s line of argument
that the prohibition laid down in Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive concerns
only advertising media which are of a local or national nature and lack cross-
border effects.
Recourse to [Article 114 TFEU] as a legal basis does not presuppose the
existence of an actual link with free movement between the Member States in
every situation covered by the measure founded on that basis. As the Court has
previously pointed out, to justify recourse to [Article 114 TFEU] as the legal
basis what matters is that the measure adopted on that basis must actually be
intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of
the internal market.145
The Court of Justice has therefore confirmed that the scope of Article 114 TFEU is
not unlimited. Nevertheless, despite the limits set in Tobacco Advertising I,
subsequent cases suggest that the EU actually retains a broad margin of discretion
under this provision – certainly broader than Tobacco Advertising I may have led
us to believe.146 The case law of the Court allows the EU to adopt a wide range of
measures with public health implications as part of its internal market policy.147
144. The Court of Justice noted that the 2003 directive did not contain a minimum harmonization
clause as the 1998 directive did. ‘Article 8 of the Directive provides that the Member States are
not to prohibit or restrict the free movement of products which comply with the Directive. This
article consequently precludes Member States from impeding the movement within the EU of
publications intended exclusively for professionals in the tobacco trade, inter alia by means of
more restrictive provisions which they consider necessary in order to protect human health
with regard to advertising or sponsorship for tobacco products’ (at para. 73). On this point, see
M. Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization after Tobacco Advertising and Laval Un Partneri’, in
M. Bulterman et al. (eds), Views of European Law from the Mountain: Liber Amicorum for
Piet Jan Slot (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009), at 3.
145. Tobacco Advertising II, at paras 79 and 80.
146. For a criticism of the case law, see D. Wyatt, ‘Community Competence to Regulate the
Internal Market’, University of Oxford Faculty of Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
Working Paper N 9/2007, July 2007.
147. Even a total ban on the marketing of a product can be justified under Art. 114 TFEU. See Case
C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, in which Swedish Match unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the prohibition of the marketing in the UK of tobacco products for oral use stemming
from Art. 8 of Directive 2001/37 on Tobacco Products (OJ 2001 L194/26), adopted on the joint
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iii. Obesity Prevention and the Competence of the EU
to Facilitate the Proper Functioning of the Internal
Market: the Problem of In-School Marketing
By analogy, some forms of food marketing regulation fall within the scope of EU
competence, such as television, internet, radio and other forms of advertising
which affect the functioning of the internal market. They can be adopted lawfully
on the basis of Article 114 TFEU due to their cross-border effects. By contrast,
other measures relating to the marketing of food are unlikely to be validly adopted
under Article 114 TFEU, insofar as they neither affect trade between Member
States nor lead to appreciable distortions of competition. The Tobacco Advertising
judgments suggest that this would be the case, in particular for:
– static forms of food advertising (adverts in hotels, on billboards, parasols,
ashtrays and similar items);
– spots in cinemas;
– sponsorship of events that do not have any cross-border appeal.
In these cases, the EU does not have the required powers to adopt harmonizing
legislation and it is for each Member State to regulate such forms of food mar-
keting, if they wish to do so. The freedom of Member States would only be
constrained by the general Treaty provisions preventing Member States from hin-
dering the free movement of goods and the free movement of services under
Articles 34 and 56 TFEU, respectively.
It remains that determining the exact contours of EU competence may be
extremely controversial. For example, one may wonder whether the EU could
lay down common rules regulating in-school marketing.
Children are an increasingly important target group for advertisers; this is not
surprising in light of the fact that two-thirds of the products that people use when
they are children they continue to use when they become adults, and that children
increasingly decide what their parents buy.148 Consequently, schools, where they
are gathered together, are seen as the ideal place for spreading advertising mes-
sages targeted at children. This is all the more so as schools themselves tend to
guarantee the interest and quality of the messages. The difficulty encountered by
schools in finding the necessary funding to carry out interesting activities outside
the core curriculum explains why economic operators have managed to establish a
strong presence in schools.
Notwithstanding the fact that in-school marketing is one of the fastest growing
marketing techniques directed at children,149 it is still relatively unregulated. This
legal basis of Arts 114 and 207 TFEU (the latter article refers to the Union’s Common
Commercial Policy).
148. On the regulation of food marketing to children, see Ch. 5 below.
149. In-school marketing can take a variety of forms. Most commonly, companies provide educa-
tion packs to schools containing sponsored material mentioning the company and often con-
taining free coupons or samples together with educational material. Alternatively, they may
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is regrettable insofar as it may be particularly damaging to children’s education,
precisely because it takes place in an environment where they expect to learn what
is best for them; they may get the impression that the school endorses this mar-
keting technique, which makes it even more difficult for them to distinguish
between advertising and education.150 The fact that food business operators are
well represented in schools also raises public health concerns, in light of the fact
that unhealthy foodstuffs are advertised to children leading to mixed messages
being sent regarding the importance of a healthy diet.151
Acceptance of the need to regulate in-school marketing is gaining ground.
Some EU Member States have already intervened in this field. For example, vend-
ing machines selling unhealthy food to schoolchildren have been banned from
French schools since 1 September 2005.152 Moreover, growing international
pressure has provided the incentive to food business operators to limit, to some
extent at least, the amount of in-school marketing they engage in. For example,
eleven major food business operators, representing more than 50% of the food and
beverage advertising expenditure in the EU, have undertaken not to make any
communication related to their products in primary schools, except where specif-
ically requested by, or agreed with, the school administration for educational
purposes.153 The importance of protecting children from harmful forms of mar-
keting in the school environment has most recently been acknowledged by the
WHO in its Resolution on marketing of food and beverages to children: ‘settings
where children gather should be free from all forms of marketing of [unhealthy]
foods’.154
Bearing in mind that in-school marketing affects all Member States, the
question arises whether the EU could adopt harmonizing legislation on the basis
of Article 114 TFEU. No other legal basis is available: Article 168 TFEU excludes
organize contests in the school environment, send free samples to schools or sponsor school
equipment or school events.
150. On in-school marketing, see C. Hawkes, Marketing Food to Children: the Global Regulatory
Environment (Geneva: WHO, 2004), at 32.
151. For particularly worrying examples of marketing in the classroom, see R. Watts & L. Hulbert,
Through the Back Door: An Expose´ of Educational Material Produced by the Food Industry
(London: The Children’s Food Campaign, December 2008), <www.sustainweb.org/pdf/
Through_the_Back_Door.pdf>.
According to this report, UK companies alone spend an estimated GBP 300 million every
year on advertising in the classroom.
152. Article 30 of Public Health Act 2004-806, 9 Aug. 2004.
153. These eleven companies are: Burger King, Coca-Cola, Danone, Ferrero, General Mills,
Kellogg, Kraft, Mars, Nestle´, PepsiCo and Unilever. This undertaking, referred to as ‘the
EU Pledge’, is not confined to schools. The EU Pledge is available at <www.eu-pledge.
eu>. The EU Platform has also led to commitments by its members relating to food marketing
restrictions, though most of them tend to be rather modest, as discussed more fully in Ch. 5.
154. Recommendation 5, World Health Assembly Resultion WHA63.14 (May 2010). Recommen-
dation 5 further provides that ‘such settings include, but are not limited to, nurseries, schools,
school-grounds and pre-school centres, cultural activities that are held on these premises’.
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legislative harmonization in the field of public health; so does Article 165 TFEU in
the field of education. As discussed above, a measure may only be adopted on the
basis of Article 114 TFEU if it is actually intended to improve the conditions for
the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Applying the case law of
the Court of Justice, the measure must contribute: (1) to the elimination of obsta-
cles to the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services; or (2) to
the elimination of distortions of competition. On the first point, the Court has
accepted that Article 114 TFEU could be used to prevent the emergence of future
obstacles to trade resulting from multifarious development of national laws. Nev-
ertheless, the emergence of such obstacles must be likely and the measure in
question must be designed to prevent them.155 Mere disparities in national rules
are not sufficient to empower the EU to adopt harmonizing legislation on the basis
of Article 114 TFEU. At present, there is probably little cross-border movement of
educational materials. Moreover, the sponsorship of school events tends to be
organized at a local level. Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the appearance of a
future EU market for certain types of educational material. If most of the material
used in school will remain country- or even region-specific in light of local cul-
tures, customs and traditions, one could envisage some exceptions to this rule: if all
EU pupils are taught foreign languages as a result of European integration, one
could conceive that textbooks may be produced on a larger scale for a wider
European audience. If a business operator was to get involved in the production
of, say, English language textbooks, we could argue that regulating how this
involvement should take place could be done via harmonizing legislation adopted
by the EU for all Member States on the basis of Article 114 TFEU.
As regards the elimination of distortions of competition, the effects of the
advantages accruing to business operators established in Member States whose
legislation is not as restrictive as in others must be appreciable to allow the EU to
remove them on the basis of harmonizing internal market legislation. To date,
however, it seems unlikely that the differences between certain national regula-
tions on in-school marketing have given rise to considerable repercussions on the
conditions of competition for undertakings associated with such marketing.156
The answer may not be as straightforward as first appears. One could wonder
whether the EU could not adopt some legislation concerning the regulation of the
content of vending machines in schools. If certain Member States allow the sale of
unhealthy food to children within school premises, whereas others ban it, the
argument could perhaps successfully be made that food operators have an incentive
to sell more in the former States than in the latter, giving rise to appreciable
distortions of competition. The answer would depend on the degree of compara-
bility of the content of vending machines in the different Member States.
155. Analogy with para. 86 of the ruling in Tobacco Advertising I.
156. Analogy with paras 106–113 of the ruling in Tobacco Advertising I.
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The conclusion of the study on in-school marketing carried out for the
Commission by GMV Conseil in 1998 that the EU has no competence to adopt
harmonizing legislation may therefore need to be refined, depending on the
marketing technique employed.157 The EU’s legislative competence in this field
certainly remains limited, but it may not be inexistent. In any event, as Member
States are all confronted to the need to regulate in-school marketing, there is a
strong case that the Commission should support their action by coordinating
research into the effects of this marketing technique on children and how best
to address the issue, and by facilitating the exchange of best practice and moni-
toring its effectiveness.158
This chapter has, so far, established that despite the restrictive wording of
Article 168 TFEU, the EU has some competence to act in relation to obesity
prevention, and even has a duty to do so in light of the scope of the epidemic
and the EU’s mandate to ensure a high level of public health protection in all its
policies. Nevertheless, it must act in accordance with the rule that, if a measure is
concerned with public health without pertaining to any other fields of EU compe-
tence, Article 168(5) TFEU prevents the EU from adopting legislative measures
harmonizing the laws of the Member States. An intervention based on a soft law
approach is however not excluded, through the adoption of EU recommendations
and other guidelines for action.
4. Obesity Prevention and International Cooperation
Finally, Article 168 TFEU explicitly requires that the EU and its Member States
foster international cooperation, in particular with the competent international
organizations in the sphere of public health.159 This is crucial in relation to
obesity in light of the consensus that only a coordinated approach involving all
levels of governance is likely to solve the problems associated with this health
condition.
This book is not intended to examine the relations of the EU with the wider
world.160 The following paragraphs only purport to offer an overview of the rela-
tionship which the EU has developed with the WHO in an attempt to foster
international cooperation on health matters, and on overweight and obesity pre-
vention more specifically.
The European Commission has had long-standing bilateral relations with the
WHO. Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, and the
157. GMV Conseil, Study on Commercial Practices in Schools (Brussels: DG SANCO, European
Commission, October 1998), <ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/surveys/sur03_
en.html>.
158. See the Commission’s Obesity Prevention Green Paper, COM (2005) 637 final, discussed in
Ch. 2 above.
159. Article 168(3) TFEU.
160. P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Founda-
tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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development of an EU competence in the area of public health, this cooperation
was strengthened:
The Commission and the WHO have roles and duties, which extend world-
wide. Whilst their nature, means and procedures are different, they have
nevertheless common interests in a large number of areas related to health.
Above all they are both committed to striving for a high level of human health
protection and health improvement. From their effective cooperation in this
changed and changing world a lot of good can be derived not only for the
Member States of the European Union which are all members of the WHO but
also for the other countries which are represented at the WHO. Member States
of the [EU] and those of the WHO have repeatedly stressed the need for such
cooperation and the desire to avoid any unnecessary duplication in effort while
pursuing common objectives.161
This statement was accompanied by the publication of a Memorandum organizing
the bilateral cooperation of the EU and the WHO, setting out priorities and means
of collaboration and highlighting the importance of exchanging best practice. With
regard to obesity more specifically, both the WHO and the EU have called for the
need to develop multi-level, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholders evidence-based
strategies and have organized regular joint meetings of senior officials representing
both organizations to this effect. The cooperation extends to planning obesity
prevalence surveys. The seventh official meeting of senior officials of the
European Commission and the WHO held in October 2008 emphasized the impor-
tance of carrying out more work relating, in particular, to nutrition and food
quality.162
To ensure the exchange of best practice with regard to obesity the WHO has
been granted observer status and attends EU Platform and High Level Group
meetings.163 Similarly, the EU has played an integral role in the development
of the WHO European Charter on Counteracting Obesity, published in November
2006.164
The existence of similar priorities has led to common projects, financed jointly
by both organizations.165 In particular, the EU and the WHO have invested to
161. See the exchange of letters between the WHO and the European Commission concerning the
consolidation and intensification of cooperation, 2000, OJ 2001 C1/04, at 1.
162. For the minutes of the meeting held in Brussels on 23 and 24 Oct. 2008, see <ec.europa.eu/
health/ph_international/int_organizations/docs/ev20081023_mi_en.pdf>.
163. On the roles of these fora, see Ch. 2 above.
164. At that time, only the EC rather than the EU as a whole had legal personality. Thus, only the EC
could ratify international conventions. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
EU has replaced the EC and now enjoys legal personality (Art. 47 TEU). The EU also con-
vened a public/private partnerships meeting during the Charter conference and flew in EU
Platform members to participate in the events in Istanbul.
165. For example, on 28 Mar. 2007, DG SANCO and the Regional Office for Europe of the WHO
held a joint signing ceremony in Brussels for a new round of collaborative projects covering
European health policy priorities on environment and health, injuries, equity in health, health
security, health services, alcohol and emergency medical services, to be implemented over a
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collect reliable health-related information and set up databases of comparable
data intended to inform policy making, not least the database on physical
activity.166
Furthermore, the EU and the Regional Office for Europe of the WHO both
contribute to the European network for the promotion of health-enhancing physical
activity (HEPA). HEPA Europe is a collaborative project which works for better
health through physical activity among all people, by strengthening and supporting
efforts to increase participation and improve the conditions for healthy lifestyles, in
particular by promoting physical activity as a healthy means for sustainable trans-
port. The objectives of HEPA Europe are:
– to promote a better understanding of HEPA and give a stronger voice to
physical activity promotion in health policy and in other relevant sectors in
Europe;
– to develop, support, and disseminate effective strategies and multi-sectoral
approaches in the promotion of HEPA;
– to foster the preservation and creation of social and physical environments
as well as values and lifestyles supportive of HEPA; and
– to improve coordination in physical activity promotion across sectors and
administrative structures.
The focus is placed on population-based approaches for the promotion of HEPA,
using the best available scientific evidence. All activities of HEPA Europe are
based on WHO policy statements, such as the Global Strategy for Diet, Physical
Activity and Health, the European Charter on Counteracting Obesity, and on
corresponding statements from the European Commission. Network activities
emphasize cooperation, partnerships and collaboration with other related sectors,
networks and approaches. Membership is open to organizations and institutions
active at the international, national or sub-national level willing to contribute to the
goals and objectives of the network, including:
– government bodies such as ministries and agencies at the national and sub-
national level involved with the promotion of HEPA (e.g., Ministries of
Health, Sports, Education, Transport, agencies for health promotion, etc.);
– research and other scientific institutions;
– NGOs;
– other institutions or organizations active in a related field; and
– interested individuals (upon invitation from the Steering Committee).167
Apart from the joint projects involving technical and financial cooperation as well
as the exchange of best practice on issues of common interest, the representation of
period of three years. The overall budget of the package is EUR 4,232,963. The EU Public
Health Programme covers 60% of the cost. The statement is available at <ec.europa.eu/health/
ph_international/int_organizations/final_statement.pdf>.
166. See Ch. 8 below for more information.
167. <www.euro.who.int/hepa>.
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the EU in the WHO allows the Union to influence WHO policy and even ratify
WHO instruments and thus participate in the development of international health
law.168 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control of 2003 (the FCTC is the
first ever global public health treaty)169 and the International Health Regulations of
2005170 provide good examples of what the WHO has achieved in recent years.
In light of repeated calls for action on the part of a wide range of stakeholders,
recommendations have just been adopted on the marketing of food and non-
alcoholic beverages to children.
In Resolution WHA60.23 on ‘Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable
Diseases: Implementation of the Global Strategy’, the World Health Assembly
requested the Director-General to promote initiatives aimed at implementing the
Global Strategy with the purpose of increasing availability of healthy food and
promoting healthy diets and healthy eating habits and to promote responsible
marketing including the development of a set of recommendations on the market-
ing of foods and non-alcoholic beverages to children, in order to reduce the impact
of foods high in saturated fats, trans-fatty acids, free sugars or salt, in dialogue with
all relevant stakeholders, including private sector parties, while ensuring avoid-
ance of potential conflict of interest.
As a result, the WHO convened a Forum and Technical Meeting on marketing
food and non-alcoholic beverages to children in Oslo in May 2006:
– the Forum reviewed the current state of knowledge regarding the influence
of marketing, including advertising of foods and non-alcoholic beverages
on children’s dietary choices;
– it discussed the implications of this influence on children’s nutritional sta-
tus; and
– it reviewed national experiences and actions taken by various stakeholders
to address the issue.
Forum participants included representatives of: health and consumer groups, food
and advertising industry trade associations, ministries of health, UN agencies,
European Commission and academics. A Technical Meeting was held after the
Forum. It was attended by academics and representatives of ministries of health,
UN agencies and the European Commission. During the Technical Meeting,
working groups reviewed and discussed the current state of knowledge on the
influences of marketing on dietary choices, the management and limitation of
the negative influences of marketing and advertising of foods and non-alcoholic
beverages on children’s dietary choices; and the possible roles stakeholders could
play. The WHO developed a set of recommendations on the marketing of food and
non-alcoholic beverages to children which were endorsed at the Sixty-third World
168. On the effect of international conventions in the EU legal order, see P. Eeeckhout, External
Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), in particular Ch. 11.
169. <www.who.int/fctc/en/index.html>.
170. <www.who.int/features/qa/39/en/index.html>.
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Health Assembly in May 2010 through Resolution WHA63.14, which calls on all
193 WHO Contracting Parties to reduce both the exposure of children to food
marketing and the impact it has on them.171
Finally, the EU is a member of the Codex Alimentarius. The Codex Alimen-
tarius was set up in 1963 as a joint instrument of the FAO and the WHO. Its primary
purpose is to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practices in
international food trade; to this effect, it develops food safety standards which
serve as a reference for international food trade.172 The standards and guidelines
of the Codex represent the consensus reached through discussion between its
members,173 which include the EU and its Member States. The EU and the Mem-
ber States attempt to present joint comments on the issues discussed in Codex
Committees which fall within the scope of EU competence. International NGOs
from industry and food/health/consumer associations may ask to attend the annual
meetings of Codex committees as observers.
Certain aspects of the work of the Codex Commission is relevant to the EU’s
obesity prevention strategy.174 In particular, the Committee on Food Labelling
develops guidelines on food claims. The General Guidelines on Claims, developed
in 1979, establish general principles to ensure that no food is described or presented
in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive.175 Specific claims are prohibited,
notably those which:
– imply that any given food will provide an adequate source of all essential
nutrients;
– imply that a balanced diet or ordinary foods cannot supply adequate
amounts of all nutrients;
– cannot be substantiated; and
– imply the suitability of a food in the prevention, alleviation, treatment or
cure of a disease, disorder or particular physiological condition, unless
specifically allowed for by a Codex standard or guideline, or by national
legislation.
171. For information on the consultation process and relevant documents, see <www.who.int/
dietphysicalactivity/marketing-food-to-children/en/index.html>. The content of Resolution
WHA63.14 is discussed more fully in Ch. 5 below.
172. For information on the Codex Alimentarius, see <www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.
jsp>. Although the implementation of the Codex Alimentarius is voluntary, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures considers that WTO
members applying the Codex Alimentarius standards meet their obligations under this
Agreement.
173. Now 183: 182 member countries and one member organization (the EU).
174. The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s strategic plan for 2008–2013 mentions explicitly the
need to review and develop Codex standards and related texts for food labelling and nutrition,
taking into account scientific and technological developments and the WHO Global Strategy
on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (at para. 1.3), <ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/
StrategicFrame/Strategic_En.pdf>.
175. CAC/GL 1-1979, Rev. 1–1991.
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The General Guidelines on Claims have been supplemented by the Guidelines for
Use of Nutrition and Health Claims.176
The cooperation of the EU with the WHO can therefore take a variety of
forms. It has intensified in recent years so as to address overweight and obesity
in line with the common principles for action which the two organizations have
developed.177
II. OBESITY PREVENTION AND THE EXERCISE OF
EU POWERS: THE PRINCIPLES OF SUBSIDIARITY
AND PROPORTIONALITY
Once it is established that the Union has the competence to act in a given policy
area, the questions arise, firstly, whether it should exercise its powers and, sec-
ondly, how it should do so. These questions are embodied in the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality, respectively, which are constitutional principles
of the EU legal order and which are, as such, subject to judicial review under
Article 263 TFEU (ex-Article 230 EC). The principle of subsidiarity relates to
the question whether or not the EU should exercise its regulatory powers, whereas
the principle of proportionality relates to the question of the intensity of EU inter-
vention. These two principles work in tandem.
The role of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the EU legal
order can be assessed from two points of view: during the legislative process
176. CAC/GL 23-1997, as amended in 2004 and 2009. EU legislation on nutrition and health claims
was adopted in December 2006 and is discussed in Ch. 4 below. It is only in 2009 that health
claims were finally included in the Codex Guidelines. They were originally included in the
scope of the Guidelines for Use of Nutrition Claims. Nevertheless, disagreement among
members of the Codex Committee on Food Labelling led to their removal (except those
concerning nutrient function) from the draft Guidelines for Use of Nutrition Claims and to
the deferral of discussion in order not to compromise the adoption of the draft. The disagree-
ment centred on health claims referring to disease. There was consensus that disease/cure
claims should be prohibited, but positions varied widely over permitting references to disease
or disease reduction. After six years of further discussions, the Codex Committee on Food
Labelling agreed, at its 31st Session in 2003, to forward draft guidelines on the use of health
claims to the Codex Alimentarius Commission for official adoption. The draft guidelines
would have defined and permitted nutrient function, other function and reduction of disease
risk claims under certain conditions. However, the Commission did not accept the draft, which
was then returned to the Food Labelling Committee for further consideration. The key area of
disagreement was over the application of the guidelines to the use of health claims in food
advertisements as well as on food labels. For more information, see the Commission’s dis-
cussion paper on food labelling and advertising. Available at <europa.eu/comm/food/fs/ifsi/
eupositions/ccfl/ccfl_cl2005_item8_en.pdf>.
177. Some discussion groups have also been set up to favour bilateral cooperation. This is notably
the case of the Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, the forum of US and EU consumer orga-
nizations which develops and agrees on joint consumer policy recommendations to the US
government and the EU to promote the consumer interest in EU and US policy making. More
information is available at <www.tacd.org/>.
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(ex-ante) and once legislation has been adopted (ex-post). This section considers
each of these two principles in turn from both points of view.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
Subsidiarity refers to the state of being subsidiary. In EU jargon, the concept of
subsidiarity is designed to act as ‘a constitutional safeguard of federalism in lim-
iting the exercise of powers granted to the European Union’.178 To this effect,
Article 5(1) TEU provides that ‘the use of Union competences is governed by the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’. Article 5(3) TEU states that ‘under
the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive com-
petence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level
or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’.179 It is relevant only in areas of
shared and supporting competence between the EU and its Member States: in areas
where the competence is exclusive either to the EU or to Member States, the
principle does not apply.
Article 5(3) TEU expressly refers to the ‘Protocol on the Application of the
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality’.180 This protocol, which is a revised
version of the protocol that the Amsterdam Treaty had introduced,181 is intended to
establish the conditions for the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality with a view to defining more precisely the criteria for applying
them and to ensure their strict observance and consistent implementation by all
institutions.
Article 5 of the Old Protocol required that all measures be expressly justified
with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which meant that
the Commission had to ‘justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to the
principle of subsidiarity; wherever necessary, the explanatory memorandum
accompanying a proposal will give details in this respect’.182 The Council and the
Parliament had to consider the consistency of the Commission’s proposals with the
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.183 Impact assessments had to be
178. R. Schu¨tze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism?’,
Cambridge Law Journal 68 (2009): 643. See fn. 2 of this article for selected academic refer-
ences on the principle of subsidiarity.
179. See also the Preamble to the TEU which provides that ‘decisions are taken as closely as
possible to the citizen’.
180. Protocol (N 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality (2008),
OJ 2008 C115/201, at 206 (the New Protocol).
181. Protocol (N 30) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
(1997), OJ 2006 C321 E/308 (the Old Protocol).
182. Article 9 of the Old Protocol.
183. Article 11 of the Old Protocol.
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systematically relied upon to provide the necessary guidance on whether the
principle of subsidiarity was duly upheld.
At the end of the day, the question remained who was to enforce this protocol.
National courts did not (and still do not) have the powers to assess the legality of an
EU act, as it would challenge the Court of Justice’s position as ‘Supreme Court of
the EU’.184 The Court of Justice has tended to scrutinize EU acts rather leniently as
regards their compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It has applied a
‘manifest error’ test. In the Working Time Directive case, for example, the UK
challenged the validity of Directive 93/104, harmonizing certain aspects of the
organization of working time.185 One of the grounds for review was that ‘the [EU]
legislature neither fully considered nor adequately demonstrated whether there
were transnational aspects which could not be satisfactorily regulated by national
measures, whether such measures would conflict with the requirements of the
[Treaties] or significantly damage the interests of Member States or, finally,
whether action at [EU] level would provide clear benefits compared with action
at national level’.186 The Court rejected the UK’s contention, stating that ‘the
Council must be allowed a wide discretion in an area which, as here, involves the
legislature in making social policy choices and requires it to carry out complex
assessments . . . Judicial review of the exercise of that discretion must therefore be
limited to examining whether it has been vitiated by manifest error or misuse of
powers, or whether the institution concerned has manifestly exceeded the limits of
its discretion’.187 Consequently, even though the principle of subsidiarity is jus-
ticiable, the Court has so far refused to scrutinize its application in any detail.188
Political institutions have therefore been the main guardians of the Union’s
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This has led certain commentators to
express the view that subsidiarity has not been taken very seriously by European
constitutionalism.189
The New Protocol brings about a significant change, ‘giving teeth to the
principle of subsidiarity . . . by entrusting national parliaments with responsibility
184. Article 263 TFEU.
185. OJ 1993 L307/18.
186. Case C-84/94 UK v. Council [1996] ECR I-5755, at para. 46. Other aspects of this case
(competence issue, scope of Art. 137 TFEU, meaning of health and safety at work, minimum
harmonization) are discussed in Ch. 8 below.
187. Case C-84/94 UK v. Council [1996] ECR I-5755, at para. 58.
188. As Ge´rard Lyon-Caen stated, ‘subsidiarity can cut both ways’: G. Lyon-Caen, ‘Subsidiarity’,
in P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra & S. Simitis (eds), European Community Labour Law:
Principles and Perspectives. Liber Amicorum Lord Wedderburn of Charlton (Oxford: Oxford
Clarendon Press, 1996), at 49. For a more careful language, see the recent judgment of the
Court in the Roaming Regulation case: ‘the [EU] legislature could legitimately take the view
that it had to intervene at the level of retail charges as well. Thus, by reason of the effects of the
common approach laid down in Regulation 717/2007, the objective pursued by that regulation
could best be achieved at [EU] level.’ (Case C-58/08 Vodafone and others [2010] ECR I-xxx,
judgment of 8 Jun. 2010, not yet reported, at para. 78.
189. G. Berman, ‘Proportionality and Subsidiarity’, in C. Barnard & J. Scott (eds), The Law of the
Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), at 86.
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for monitoring its application’.190 To that end, it establishes a yellow-card
mechanism.191 Under this system, each national parliament can produce a reasoned
opinion stating if it considers that a European legislative proposal infringes the
principle of subsidiarity. Where at least one-third of national parliaments objects,
the proposal must be formally reviewed.192 After the review, the body that has
produced the proposal must decide whether to maintain, amend or withdraw the
draft, providing reasons for its decision.193 If, however, it is decided to maintain the
proposal, a simple majority of voting MEPs or 55% of Council members which
believe that the proposal infringes the principle of subsidiarity are required to stop
the legislative proposal.194 The question of how powerful the yellow-card mech-
anism will be in practice remains to be seen. What happens if the initiator of an act
amends the disputed act without addressing the issues raised in the reasoned opin-
ions is unclear.195 A literal reading of the New Protocol suggests that national
parliaments will have no power under the yellow-card mechanism to stop the
proposed measure on this ground.196 Furthermore, it is unclear whether national
parliaments will be able to deal with all measures which are communicated to
them within the eight-week period allocated.197 In any event, the New Protocol
should nonetheless lead to a higher degree of scrutiny of the compliance of the
EU legislature with the principle of subsidiarity not only ex ante but also ex post,
as national parliaments have been granted the necessary powers to initiate an
annulment action if they believe that the principle of subsidiarity has been
infringed.198
The Obesity Prevention White Paper has explicitly acknowledged that several
of the measures required to prevent overweight and obesity may be more effective
if they are adopted at a national or even at a local level – a view which the
Committee of the Regions has explicitly reinforced.199 The measures relating to
190. M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, Common Market Law
Review 45 (2008): 617, at 659.
191. Articles 6 and 7 of the New Protocol. For more regarding the changes which the Lisbon Treaty
has introduced with respect to the principle of subsidiarity, see S. Weatherill, ‘Using National
Parliaments to Improve Scrutiny of the Limits of EU Action’, European Law Review 28
(2003): 909; R. Schu¨tze, ‘Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federal-
ism?’, Cambridge Law Journal 68 (2009): 643; I. Cooper, ‘The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity:
National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies
44 (2006): 281.
192. Article 7(2) of the New Protocol.
193. Article 7(2) of the New Protocol.
194. Article 7(3)(b) of the new Protocol.
195. See M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’, Common Market
Law Review 45 (2008): 617, at 660.
196. Under Art. 7(3)(b) of the New Protocol, the termination of the legislative procedure applies
only if the initiator of an act maintains its original proposal without amendments.
197. Article 6(1) of the New Protocol.
198. Article 263 TFEU.
199. Committee of the Regions, Opinion of the Commission for Sustainable Development on
‘A Strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity Related Health Issues’, OJ
2008 C105/34.
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the establishment of an EU School Fruit Scheme provide a good example of how
the principle of subsidiarity comes into play. Under this Scheme, which is dis-
cussed more fully in Chapter 7 below, Member States wishing to make use of the
Scheme, at national or at regional level, must draw up a prior strategy and provide
for the accompanying measures necessary to make the Scheme effective. Each
national strategy, which is financed primarily by Member States, must lay down the
manner in which a School Fruit Scheme can best be implemented and integrated
into the school curriculum. The aim is to ensure that such a strategy is tailored to
national preferences, in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity: EU inter-
vention must cease where it does not add value to action defined at national or local
level.200 More generally, the EU must determine, before adopting any measure,
whether it should abstain from interfering with national choices, notwithstanding
the fact that it may have the required competence to act under Article 5(1) TEU.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
Proportionality refers to the intensity or scale of EU action. It is only if its inter-
vention is necessary that the EU should act. Article 5(4) TEU provides that ‘under
the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties’, and the New
Protocol adds that ‘draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any
burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national gov-
ernments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be
minimized and commensurate with the objective to be achieved’.201
The principle of proportionality requires that the means should be appropriate
for attaining the objective pursued and should not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve it. It therefore requires that account be taken of the means proposed to
achieve the objective of a given measure and that their impact on competing
interests be considered in the balancing exercise.202 As discussed below, however,
the Court of Justice leaves a broad margin of discretion to EU institutions exercis-
ing their law-making powers. It is therefore all the more important that the pro-
portionality of a measure is assessed ex ante as part of the law-making process, in
particular through the use of rigorous impact assessments.
The regulation of advertising provides a good example of how the Court has
interpreted the principle of proportionality. This example is all the more valuable
as it could be transposed to food advertising more specifically and therefore illus-
trates the importance of the proportionality principle in the development of the
Union’s obesity prevention strategy.
200. On the School Fruit Scheme, see Ch. 7 below. On the role which schools can play as a priority
setting in obesity prevention strategies, see the case study below.
201. Article 5(4) TEU read together with Art. 5 of the New Protocol.
202. See, inter alia, Case 137/85 Maizena and Others [1987] ECR 4587, at para. 15; Case C-339/02
ADM O¨lmu¨hlen [1993] ECR I-6473, at para. 15; and Case C-210/00 Ka¨serei Champignon
Hofmeister [2002] ECR I-6453, at para. 59.
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Several stakeholders have called for a ban or at least the strict regulation of
unhealthy food advertising to children as an important measure to reverse current
overweight and obesity trends. As discussed more fully in Chapter 5 below, the
food and advertising industries have objected to these proposals on several
grounds. In particular, they have argued that obliging them to alter their marketing
practices would limit their freedom to promote their goods and therefore negatively
affect their fundamental right to free expression. It is therefore necessary to deter-
mine the extent to which the EU can invoke the protection of public health to
regulate the marketing of unhealthy food to children and how it would balance
competing claims. As discussed above, however, this question presupposes that the
forms of marketing at stake have a cross-border effect granting the EU the
necessary competence to act in the first place.
The Tobacco Advertising litigation offers some useful indications on how the
Court of Justice assesses the proportionality of EU measures, and EU measures
imposing advertising restrictions more specifically. As stated above, Germany
had challenged the tobacco advertsing directives of 1998 and 2003 on a variety
of grounds. In the first case, the Court did not need to discuss the question whether
the measure infringed the principle of proportionality, since it held that the EU
lacked the competence to adopt the 1998 directive, and annulled the measure in its
entirety. In the second case, however, the Court held that by adopting the 2003
directive the EU legislature had not infringed the principle of conferral. It was
therefore necessary to assess the other arguments put forward by Germany, includ-
ing whether the measure had been adopted in violation of the principle of
proportionality.
The Court of Justice held, on the basis of its settled case law, that the principle
of freedom of expression was a fundamental right protected as a general principle
of EU law. Fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law
the observance of which the Court ensures. For that purpose, it draws upon the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines
supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the
Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has special significance in that respect.203
Under Article 10(1) ECHR, ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights204 indicates that all forms
203. See, inter alia, Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para. 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v.
Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, para. 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Fre`res [2002] ECR I-9011,
at para. 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, at para. 71; and Case C-71/02
Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, at para. 48.
204. For the readers who are not familiar with EU law, it is important to note that the European
Court of Human Rights is a different entity from the CJEU. The European Court of Human
Rights is seated in Strasbourg and is the Court of the Council of Europe. Its main task is to
adjudicate violations of the ECHR. The CJEU is seated in Luxembourg and is the Court of
the EU.
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of expression are protected under this provision, including commercial expression
which consists in the provision of information, expression of ideas or communi-
cation of images as part of the promotion of a commercial activity and the
concomitant right to receive such communications.205 Individuals’ freedom to
promote commercial activities derives not only from their right to engage in eco-
nomic activities and the general commitment, in the EU context, to a market
economy based upon free competition, but also from their inherent entitlement
as human beings freely to express and receive views on any topic, including the
merits of the goods or services which they market or purchase. Commercial expres-
sion must therefore be protected in the EU legal order.
Nevertheless, the Court has also confirmed that the exercise of freedom of
expression may be subject to certain restrictions in order to secure the enjoyment of
rights by others or the achievement of certain objectives in the public interest,
including public health protection. This is all the more justified as commercial
expression is regarded as a lesser form of expression than political, journalistic,
literary or artistic expression.206
To restrict the freedom of commercial operators to promote their goods and
services, the relevant public authority must establish that such restriction is in
accordance with the law, motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under
that provision and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a
pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.207
In its second Tobacco Advertising judgment, the Court of Justice recalled its
settled case law that the Union’s legislature must be allowed a broad margin of
discretion in areas which entail political, economic and social choices on its part,
and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. The legality of a
measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are
seeking to pursue.208 In its earlier ruling in the Karner case, the Court had added
205. See, for example, Markt Intern v. Germany, judgment of 20 Nov. 1989, Series A, N. 165, at
paras 25 and 26; Groppera v. Switzerland, judgment of 28 Mar. 1990, Series A, N. 173, at
para. 55; Casado Coca v. Spain, judgment of 24 Feb. 1994, Series A, N. 285, at paras 35
and 36.
206. Article 10(2) ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. Political, journalistic, literary or artistic
expression contribute to a larger extent, in a liberal democratic society, to the achievement of
social goods such as, for example, the enhancement of democratic debate and accountability
or the questioning of current orthodoxies with a view to furthering tolerance or change. By
contrast, commercial expression only promotes economic activity.
207. See, to this effect, Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689, at para. 26; Case C-60/00
Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, at para. 42; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659,
at para. 79; and Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, at para. 50.
208. See, to this effect, Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council [1996] ECR I-5755, at para. 58;
Case C-233/94 Germany v. Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, at paras 55 and 56;
Case C-157/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others [1998] ECR I-2211, at para. 61; British
American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco, at para. 123; Case C-71/02 Karner
[2004] ECR I-3025, at para. 51.
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that it would be reluctant to intervene with the margin of discretion left to com-
petent authorities in relation to the commercial use of freedom of expression,
‘particularly in a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising’.209 On this basis,
the Court stated in Tobacco Advertising II:
In the present case, even assuming that the measures laid down in Articles 3
and 4 of the Directive prohibiting advertising and sponsorship have the effect
of weakening freedom of expression indirectly, journalistic freedom of
expression, as such, remains unimpaired and the editorial contributions of
journalists are therefore not affected. It must therefore be found that the
[EU] legislature did not, by adopting such measures, exceed the limits of
the discretion which it is expressly accorded. It follows that those measures
cannot be regarded as disproportionate.210
The Court’s reasoning is strikingly brief and, as such, differs markedly from the
reasoning of Advocate General Fennelly on exactly the same point in the first
Tobacco Advertising case and that of Advocate General Le´ger in the second
Tobacco Advertising case. Two points should be underlined. First, it is the public
authority wishing to impose advertising restrictions that should bear the burden of
establishing that the measure is necessary and that no measures exist which are less
restrictive of trade and of the freedom of commercial operators to promote their
goods and services. Secondly, the Court of Justice must scrutinize the evidence
presented to ensure that the public health argument put forward to justify adver-
tising restrictions is convincing and does not rely on mere assumptions. Very often,
such evidence will exist and will support the case put forward by public authorities
wishing to restrict the advertising of certain goods or services whose excessive
consumption is detrimental to good health.
For example, the rationale for the Tobacco Advertising Directive is that con-
sumption of tobacco products is dangerous for the health of smokers and – one
could add – for people around them; that the advertising and sponsorship of
tobacco products promote such consumption; and that the prohibition of those
forms of expression will result in a reduction in tobacco consumption and, thus,
improved public health.211 The damage caused to health by smoking has not
209. Case C-71/02 Karner [2004] ECR I-3025, para. 51. The Court of Justice mentioned Case
C-245/01 RTL Television [2003] ECR I-0000, para. 73; judgments of the ECHR of 20 Nov.
1989, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
Series A N. 165, at para. 33; and of 28 Jun. 2001, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Swit-
zerland, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-VI, at paras 69–70.
210. Tobacco Advertising II, at paras 156–158.
211. Recital 3 of the Preamble provides that ‘the legislation of the Member States to be approx-
imated is intended to protect public health by regulating the promotion of tobacco, an addictive
product responsible for over half a million deaths in the EU annually, thereby avoiding a
situation where young people begin smoking at an early age as a result of promotion and
become addicted’.
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been disputed in the Tobacco Advertising cases and Germany underlined its own
desire to reduce consumption among its population. There has, however, been
considerable debate over whether the prohibition of most forms of promotion of
tobacco products can achieve a reduction in consumption of tobacco, rather than
simply affecting competition between tobacco brands. The Court could have
referred to the existing evidence supporting comprehensive bans on tobacco adver-
tising and all other forms of promotion.212 In particular, it should have referred
to the FCTC which calls upon its Contracting Parties213 to recognize that a
comprehensive ban on advertising, promotion and sponsorship would reduce the
consumption of tobacco products, and to undertake, in accordance with their con-
stitutions or constitutional principles, a comprehensive ban of all tobacco adver-
tising, promotion and sponsorship, including a cross-border advertising, promotion
and sponsorship originating from their territories.214
The Court of Justice should review existing evidence, rather than simply rule
that the EU legislature has a broad margin of discretion. Ensuring that the choices
of the EU legislature are reasonable in light of existing evidence does not mean that
the Court would substitute its own assessment. If the EU legislature wishes to adopt
a cautious approach, the Court should respect its decision. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that it should feel exempted from its duty, as the EU’s constitutional
court, to review the proportionality of legislative measures: the burden of proving
that a public health measure is proportionate rests on legislative authorities, and the
Court must ensure that they have discharged this burden. Discretion is not to be
equated with arbitrariness.215
Furthermore, it is arguable that the application of a stronger standard of review
by the Court of Justice will reinforce the constitutionality of advertising bans and
ultimately lead to a higher level of public health protection. In light of the fact that
the Court has allowed freedom of commercial expression to be restricted for public
health reasons in several cases, it is tempting to suggest that the Court’s case law
has heralded a clear victory for public health over commercial expression. On the
other hand, its insufficient and therefore unconvincing reasoning may cut both
ways. Its refusal to engage fully with the proportionality assessment of restrictions
imposed for public health reasons could have perverse results on the legislative
212. WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, The MPOWER Package, Geneva, 2008, at
36–38, with references to a range of supporting studies, including studies carried out before
the Tobacco Advertising Directive was adopted.
213. 168 to date, including the EU and its twenty-seven Member States.
214. Article 13.
215. For a comparison with the approach of US courts in similar cases, see A. Garde, ‘Freedom of
Commercial Expression and Public Health Protection in Europe’, in C. Barnard & O. Odudu
(eds), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 12 (2009–2010), forthcoming:
December 2010. See also J. Pomeranz, ‘Television Food Marketing to Children Revisited:
The Federal Trade Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Regulate’,
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 38 (2010): 98.
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process more generally, in that it does not encourage the EU legislature to justify its
legislative choices. In other words, the excessively loose standard of review
applied by the Court sends out the wrong message. A stricter standard of review
would provide the necessary incentive for the EU legislature to improve ex ante
mechanisms and ensure that the legislative measures they adopt are both as pro-
tective of public health and as respectful of fundamental rights as possible. The less
the legislature does consider the balance and engage in a thorough assessment of
competing interests, the stronger the possibility for commercial operators to claim
that their freedom of expression has been unduly restricted and that they have been
unfairly stigmatized.
Overall, the review exercised by the Court of Justice on the exercise of EU
powers is rather minimal: if the Union’s legislature has not manifestly exceeded the
limits on its discretion, the Court will not annul the measure in question for
infringement of the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality. It is therefore
all the more important that stakeholders involved in policy making ensure that
these principles are fully taken into account and complied with before legislation is
adopted and that full impact assessments are carried out at the earliest possible
stage in the legislative process and new evidence given due consideration during
this process.
A Case Study: Schools as a Priority Setting
As discussed in Chapter 2 above, the European Commission has identified
schools as a priority setting for overweight and obesity prevention strategies:
Childhood is an important period to instil a preference for healthy beha-
viours, and to learn the life skills necessary to maintain a healthy lifestyle.
Schools clearly play a crucial role in this respect. This is also an area where
there is already firm evidence of the effectiveness of intervention: studies
show that locally focused actions, with very wide ownership, targeting
0–12 year olds will be effective in changing behaviour in the long run.
Work should focus on nutrition education, and on physical activity.216
Priority Groups and Settings: Schools bear a great responsibility in
ensuring that children not only understand the importance of good nutrition
and exercise but can actually benefit from both. They can be assisted in this
through appropriate partnerships with private parties, including the busi-
ness community. Schools should be protected environments and such
partnerships should be undertaken in a transparent and non-commercial
way.217
216. Obesity Prevention White Paper, at 8.
217. Obesity Prevention White Paper, at 11.
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These statements are in line with the position of the WHO which has called upon
State Parties to develop and implement school policies and programmes that
promote healthy diets and increase levels of physical activity:
School policies and programmes should support the adoption of healthy
diets and physical activity. Schools are encouraged to provide students with
daily physical education and should be equipped with appropriate facilities
and equipment. Governments are encouraged to adopt policies that support
healthy diets at school and limit the availability of products high in salt,
sugar and fats.218
The WHO has taken a range of global initiatives in the field of school health,
several of which are specifically intended to counteract current overweight and
obesity trends. In particular, it has published the School Policy Framework with
a view to building upon existing knowledge and experience and to adding
a global policy tool that focuses on governmental action to improve dietary
patterns and increase physical activity in the school setting through changes
in environment, behaviour and education.219 Effective school interventions
require the development of coherent and comprehensive policies containing
several strands. The WHO has identified a range of policy options presented
in the following categories:
– school recognition;
– school curriculum;
– food services environment;
– physical environment;
– health promotion for school staff; and
– school health services.220
The Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health has also emphasized
the importance of the active involvement of a range of stakeholders in achieving
its objectives.221 In light of the diversity of actions required to ensure that
schools promote healthy lifestyles, this requirement is particularly relevant.
The WHO has therefore identified governments (at national, regional and local
level); teachers and other school staff; students; parents and families; the com-
munity at large (including international organizations, NGOs and the private
sector) as having a role to play in making schools healthier.222
218. Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (Geneva: WHO, May 2004), at para. 49.
219. School Policy Framework: Implementation of the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2008), <www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/SPF-en-
2008.pdf>.
220. Ibid., at 8–24.
221. Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (Geneva: WHO, May 2004), at paras 34
and 44.
222. School Policy Framework: Implementation of the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical
Activity and Health (Geneva: WHO, 2008), at 25–32.
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It is therefore necessary to determine the scope and nature of EU action in the
school setting in light of the constitutional principles of conferral, subsidiarity
and proportionality underpinning all intervention by the EU. To which extent
can the EU contribute to the policy options identified by the WHO to promote
healthy schools?
The starting point should be that the EU only has limited powers to contribute to
the overall strategy required in the school setting. This clearly stems from
Article 165 TFEU on education policy (ex-Article 149 EC):
1. The Union shall contribute to the development of quality education by
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and
the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic
diversity.
The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting
issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures
based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.
2. Union action shall be aimed at:
– developing the European dimension in education, particularly
through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Mem-
ber States,
– encouraging mobility of students and teachers, by encouraging inter
alia, the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study,
– promoting cooperation between educational establishments,
– developing exchanges of information and experience on issues
common to the education systems of the Member States,
– encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of
socio-educational instructors, and encouraging the participation of
young people in democratic life in Europe,
– encouraging the development of distance education,
– developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness
and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bod-
ies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral
integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest
sportsmen and sportswomen.
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third
countries and the competent international organizations in the field of
education, in particular the Council of Europe.
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to
in this Article:
– the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt
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incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of the laws and
regulations of the Member States,
– the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
Article 165 TFEU is comparable to Article 168 TFEU on public health, to the
extent that it explicitly excludes the legislative harmonization of national rules
by the EU. Consequently, some of the key areas identified by the WHO will
require action at national or local level. This is particularly true of the question
of school curricula. The WHO has clearly indicated that both health education
and physical education classes could be used to encourage healthy eating and
physical activity. Nevertheless, determining the content of such classes, their
frequency and their method of delivery is not within the Union’s legislative
competence. The same is true regarding the provision of school meals: both
their organization and their nutritional content will have to be determined by
national or local public authorities.
If Article 165 TFEU excludes all forms of legislative intervention, it neverthe-
less lays down the basis for an EU education policy through soft law mechan-
isms, including recommendations. In light of the fact that schools have been
identified as priority settings to fight overweight and obesity across all EU
Member States, the Union could finance research projects and facilitate the
exchange of best practice on issues of common interest. Moreover, the
Commission published a report on in-school marketing in 1998 laying down
some criteria which schools and national policy makers should bear in mind
when addressing the issue – though these criteria would gain in being more
specific, as discussed above.
Several EU Platform commitments concern schools.223 For example, Media
Smart is a media literacy programme for primary school children aged between
6 and 11 years old running from 2006 to 2010 in eight EU Member States.224 It
is intended to teach children to think critically about advertising and provides
free materials for schools using real examples of adverts.225 It is funded by the
World Federation of Advertisers (WFA). The WFA is the organization repre-
senting the common interests of marketers worldwide. Through its network of
fifty-five national advertiser associations on five continents and approximately
fifty of the world’s top 100 marketers, the WFA represents around 90% of
global marketing communications, almost USD 700 billion annually. The
223. The EU Platform even devoted a full discussion session at its plenary meeting of July 2008 to
Lifestyles and Education: see E. Millstone, EU Platform Working Paper on Lifestyles and
Education, June 2008, <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/platform/
docs/ev_20080702_wp_en.pdf>
224. Belgium, Finland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK.
225. For more information, see <ec.europa.eu/health/ph_determinants/life_style/nutrition/platform/
database/dsp_detail.cfm>.
Chapter 3
104
purpose of the WFA is ‘to champion responsible and effective marketing com-
munications worldwide’.226 Nevertheless, Media Smart has not gathered unan-
imous acceptance. In particular, the feedback from teachers who have used
the material indicates somewhat mixed results and questions its long-term
impact.227
More generally, even though a large share of EU Platform actions relates to
lifestyle and education, one may question the consistency, and therefore the
effectiveness, of the messages sent to children: on the one hand, children receive
nutrition education ‘aimed at achieving a voluntary change in nutrition related
behaviour to improve the nutritional status of the population’; on the other hand,
they receive conflicting information if food advertising is not strictly regulated
and if school vending machines selling unhealthy food are allowed on school
premises. The risk is compounded by the fact that food commercial commu-
nications are not systematically regulated by law and are often left to self-
regulation. It is interesting to note that the resistance to reducing marketing
to children has been enormous; the contrast with the enthusiasm for providing
‘consumer education’ to children is striking. Cynically, one could argue that this
notion of consumer education is a means to control the messages sent to children
as part of a damage limitation strategy and to align the brands concerned with a
‘virtuous’ image of health promotion, with a halo effect.
The argument becomes more powerful when one considers the enthusiasm with
which food business operators have sponsored a few school sport events – a
convenient way to ensure that public attention focuses on their positive role in
promoting physical activity rather than on their reluctance to curb food mar-
keting to children. It remains that food marketing affects all European children,
while the sponsorship of sport events only benefit a few. Vigilance is warranted
to avoid convenient distraction from the wider issues. Therefore, the food
industry should not be seen as the main actor in school obesity prevention
programmes. The responsibility for developing a consistent, comprehensive
approach to this public health issue lies above all with public authorities –
the fact that their resources are sometimes inadequate should not modify this
fundamental principle of risk management. If the importance of teaching chil-
dren how to think critically and to apply their critical skills to commercial
communications cannot be underestimated, the support of the Commission
for projects such as Media Smart is rather difficult to grasp.
Apart from the exchange of best practice which the EU can facilitate on the basis
of Articles 165 and 168 TFEU on education and public health, respectively, the
question arises of the extent to which the EU could adopt legislative measures
on the basis of other Treaty provisions to ensure that schools promote healthy
226. <www.wfanet.org/>.
227. E. Millstone, EU Platform Working Paper on Lifestyles and Education, June 2008, at 14.
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lifestyles. The discussion on in-school marketing has shown that the EU may be
able to regulate, on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, the extent to which food
business operators should be granted access to schools. Schools must remain
‘non-commercial’, as the Obesity Prevention White Paper itself has acknowl-
edged. Moreover, the EU has adopted a School Fruit Scheme and a School Milk
Scheme allowing for the free distribution of fruit, vegetables, milk and other
dairy products in schools as part of the Common Agricultural Policy.228
It is striking that the EU’s obesity prevention strategy must develop in a particu-
larly complex regulatory environment. Not only does it require that a distinction be
drawn between the areas where the EU has powers to intervene and those where
action is left to Member States, but also between areas where the EU is entitled to
adopt legally binding measures from those where it may only adopt persuasive soft
law measures. Once it is established that the EU has legislative competence in a
given field, it is then necessary to determine whether it should exercise its com-
petence or whether action would be more effective at national level (subsidiarity
assessment). It is only then that the intensity of EU action may be discussed
(proportionality assessment). The second part of this book applies these principles
to specific EU policies and discusses how a coherent and effective obesity pre-
vention strategy could develop within this constitutional framework.
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